Data/hora: 12/06/2024 03:42:13

Provedor de dados: 	31	
País: 	United States	
Título: 	ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND THE PRICING OF NATURAL RESOURCES: THE CASE OF UNMETERED WATER; Proceedings of the Fifth Joint Conference on Agriculture, Food, and the Environment, June 17-18, 1996, Padova, Italy	
Autores: 	Smith,   Rodney B.W.; Tsur,   Yacov.	
Data: 	2004-02-19	
Ano: 	1996	
Palavras-chave: 	Resource /Energy Economics and Policy.	
Resumo: 	This paper uses mechanism design theory to (i) propose a mechanism to price irrigation water when farmers are heterogeneous in their production technologies (adverse selection) and their individual water uses are unobserved (moral hazard) and (ii) discusses briefly when such a mechanism might be economically unreasonable. Unmetered irrigation water is often priced by imposing per-acre fees on cultivated acreage or by charging per-unit fees on observable inputs or outputs.  The offered pricing procedure is based on the observed output and achieves a first-best outcome when implementation is free of transaction costs.	
Tipo: 	Working or Discussion Paper	
Idioma: 	Inglês	
Identificador: 	12507

http://purl.umn.edu/14368	
Editor: 	AgEcon Search	
Relação: 	University of Minnesota&gt;Center for International Food and Agricultural Policy&gt;Working Papers

Working Paper WP96-04, Session VI, Paper 2	
Formato: 	16

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