Data/hora: 03/06/2024 06:24:11

Provedor de dados: | Research in Agricultural & Applied Economics (AgEcon Searh)
País: | United States
Título: | BEHAVIOURS OF CONSERVATION ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS. Analysis based on New (and not so new) Institutional Economics
Autores: | Tisdell,   Clement A.
Data: | 2008-05-08
Ano: | 2008
Palavras-chave: | Australia; Biodiversity conservation; Bounded rationality; Civil society; Common Agricultural Policy; European Union; Landcare; Mixed goods; New institutional economics; New Zealand; NGOs; Principal-and-agent problem; Political acceptability; Environmental Economics and Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Political Economy; Q00; Q2; Q5; Q57; Z13.
Resumo: | This article draws mostly (but not entirely) on new institutional economics to consider the likely behaviours of non-government conservation organizations and the implications of these behaviours for biodiversity conservation. It considers how institutional factors may result in behaviour of conservation NGOs diverging from their objectives, including their support for biodiversity conservation; examines aspects of rent capture and conservation alliances; specifies social factors that may restrict the diversity of species supported by NGOs for conservation; considers bounded rationality in relation to the operation of conservation NGOs; and using game theory, shows how competition between NGOs for funding can result in economic inefficiencies and narrow the diversity of species supported for conservation. It also considers generally how the social role of conservation NGOs might be assessed.
Tipo: | Working or Discussion Paper
Idioma: | Inglês

Identificador:

29641

http://purl.umn.edu/6185

Relação:

Humboldt University Berlin&gt;Institute for Agricultural Economics and Social Sciences&gt;Institutional Change in Agriculture and Natural Resources Discussion Papers

ICAR Discussion Paper

19/2007

Formato: | 24