Data/hora: 01/06/2024 10:49:23

Provedor de dados: | Research in Agricultural & Applied Economics (AgEcon Searh)
País: | United States
Título: | A Model of Incentive Compatibility under Moral Hazard in Livestock Disease Outbreak Response
Autores: | Gramig,   Benjamin M.; Horan,   Richard D.; Wolf,   Christopher A.
Data: | 2005-05-17
Ano: | 2005
Palavras-chave: | Livestock disease; Moral hazard; Principal-agent model; Institutional and Behavioral Economics.
Resumo: | This paper uses a principal-agent model to examine incentive compatibility in the presence of information asymmetry between the government and individual producers. Prior models of livestock disease have not incorporated information asymmetry between livestock managers and social planners. By incorporating the asymmetry, we investigate the role of incentives in producer behavior that influences the duration and magnitude of a disease epidemic.
Tipo: | Conference Paper or Presentation
Idioma: | Inglês

Identificador:

16446

http://purl.umn.edu/19200

Editor: | AgEcon Search

Relação:

American Agricultural Economics Association&gt;2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI

Selected Paper 133432

Formato:

21

application/pdf