Data/hora: 16/06/2024 09:45:32

Provedor de dados: | Research in Agricultural & Applied Economics (AgEcon Searh)
País: | United States
Título: | Project-Based Mechanisms for Emissions Reductions: Balancing Trade-offs with Baselines
Autores: | Fischer,   Carolyn.
Data: | 2005-10-26
Ano: | 2004
Palavras-chave: | Climate policy; Clean Development Mechanism; Baselines; Asymmetric information; Offsets; Emissions reduction; Tradable emissions permits; Environmental Economics and Policy; D8; Q4.
Resumo: | Project-based mechanisms for emissions reductions credits, like the Clean Development Mechanism, pose important challenges for policy design because of several inherent characteristics. Participation is voluntary, so it will not occur without sufficient credits. Evaluating reductions requires assigning an emissions baseline for a counterfactual that cannot be measured. Some investments have both economic and environmental benefits and might occur anyway. Uncertainty surrounds both emissions and investment returns, and parties to the project are likely to have more information than the certifying authority. The certifying agent is limited in its ability to design a contract that would reveal investment intentions. As a result, rules for benchmarking emissions may be systematically biased to overallocate, and they also risk creating inefficient investment incentives. This paper evaluates, in a situation with asymmetric information, the efficacy of the main baseline rules currently under consideration: historical emissions, an average industry emissions standard, and expected emissions.
Tipo: | Working or Discussion Paper
Idioma: | Inglês

Identificador:

18692

http://purl.umn.edu/10836

Editor: | AgEcon Search

Relação:

Resources for the Future&gt;Discussion Papers

Discussion Paper 04-32

Formato:

42

application/pdf