Data/hora: 09/06/2024 04:48:54

Provedor de dados: 	Research in Agricultural & Applied Economics (AgEcon Searh)	
País: 	United States	
Título: 	Are Two Economic Instruments Better Than One? Combining Taxes and Quotas under Political Lobbying	
Autores: 	Finkelshtain,   Israel; Kan,   Iddo; Kislev,   Yoav.	
Data: 	2010-08-12	
Ano: 	2010	
Palavras-chave: 	Political Economy; Natural Resources; Water; Political Economy; D72.	
Resumo: 	Direct commands, market based, or combined, whichever is the government's mean of intervention, is expected to raise political lobbying and pressure. This study offers a political-economic model of an industry, which is regulated by an integrated system of both direct and market based policies. The model is used for a normative theoretical analysis and as a basis for a structural econometric framework. Exploiting a unique data set that describes the regulations of irrigation water in Israel during the mid eighties by means of quotas and prices, the political and technological parameters of the model are structurally estimated and used to assess the relative efficiency of quotas, prices and integrated regulation regimes.	
Tipo: 	Working or Discussion Paper	
Idioma: 	Inglês	
Identificador: 	http://purl.umn.edu/93133	
Relação: 	Hebrew University of Jerusalem&gt;Department of Agricultural Economics and Management&gt;Discussion Papers

Discussion Paper

5.10	
Formato: 	42