Data/hora: 16/06/2024 08:43:34

Provedor de dados: | 31
País: | United States
Título: | Dynamics, Stability, and Foresight in the Shapley-Scarf Housing Market
Autores: | Kamijo,   Yoshio; Kawasaki,   Ryo.
Data: | 2009-08-07
Ano: | 2009
Palavras-chave: | Indivisible Goods Market; Dynamics; Competitive Allocation; Strict Core; Foresight; Stable Set; Productivity Analysis; D78; C71.
Resumo: | While most of the literature starting with Shapley and Scarf (1974) have considered a static exchange economy with indivisibilities, this paper studies the dynamics of such an economy. We find that both the dynamics generated by competitive equilibrium and the one generated by weakly dominance relation, converge to a set of allocations we define as strictly stable, which we can show to exist. Moreover, we show that even when only pairwise exchanges between two traders are allowed, the strictly stable allocations are attained eventually if traders are sufficiently farsighted.
Tipo: | Working or Discussion Paper
Idioma: | Inglês
Identificador: | http://purl.umn.edu/52526

Relação:

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)&gt;Sustainable Development Papers

SD

2009

Formato: | 17