Data/hora: 09/06/2024 14:39:26

Provedor de dados: | Research in Agricultural & Applied Economics (AgEcon Searh)
País: | United States
Título: | Collective Action in Plant Breeding
Autores: | Binenbaum,   Eran; Pardey,   Philip G.
Data: | 2005-05-17
Ano: | 2005
Palavras-chave: | Institutional and Behavioral Economics.
Resumo: | Olson (1965) formulated a "Logic of Collective Action".  We investigate whether a logic of collective action in plant breeding - and research and development generally - can be constructed. Using a case study on the Latin American Fund for Irrigated Rice (FLAR) as well as other real-world institutions of collective action in R&amp;D, we construct an expanded logic of collective action, which revolves around two core features: Impure public goods and the tragedy of the anticommons. Provisions of FLAR and other institutions are related to game theory and contract theory, and theoretical, methodological and policy implications are outlined.
Tipo: | Conference Paper or Presentation
Idioma: | Inglês

Identificador:

16518

http://purl.umn.edu/19530

Editor: | AgEcon Search

Relação:

American Agricultural Economics Association&gt;2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI

Selected Paper 135225

Formato:

35

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