Data/hora: 09/06/2024 14:51:23

Provedor de dados: 	Research in Agricultural & Applied Economics (AgEcon Searh)	
País: 	United States	
Título: 	Many-to-One Matching when Colleagues Matter	
Autores: 	Revilla,   Pablo.	
Data: 	2008-01-14	
Ano: 	2007	
Palavras-chave: 	Many-to-one matching; Hedonic; Coalitions; Stability; Colleagues; Marketing; C78; D71.	
Resumo: 	This paper studies many-to-one matching market in which each agent’s preferences not only depend on the institution that hires her, but also on the group of her colleagues, which are matched  to the same institution. With an unrestricted  domain of preferences  the non-emptiness of the core is not guaranteed. Under certain conditions on agents’ preferences, we show that two possible situations in which, at least, one stable allocation exists, emerge. The first condition, called Group Togetherness, reflects real-life situations in which agents are more concerned about an acceptable set of colleagues than about the firm hiring them. The second one, Common Best Colleague, refers to markets in which a workers’ ranking is accepted by workers and firms present in such markets.	
Tipo: 	Working or Discussion Paper	
Idioma: 	Inglês	
Identificador: 	28407

http://purl.umn.edu/7443	
Editor: 	AgEcon Search	
Relação: 	Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)&gt;Coalition Theory Network Working Papers

CTN Nota di Lavoro 87.2007	
Formato: 	34

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