Data/hora: 28/05/2024 16:11:01

Provedor de dados: | 31
País: | United States
Título: | Microfinance Games
Autores: | Gine,   Xavier; Jakiela,   Pamela; Karlan,   Dean S.; Morduch,   Jonathan.
Data: | 2006-06-28
Ano: | 2006
Palavras-chave: | Financial Economics.
Resumo: | Microfinance has been heralded as an effective way to address imperfections in credit markets. From a theoretical perspective, however, the success of microfinance contracts has puzzling elements. In particular, the group-based mechanisms often employed are vulnerable to free-riding and collusion, although they can also reduce moral hazard and improve selection. We created an experimental economics laboratory in a large urban market in Lima, Peru and over seven months conducted eleven different games that allow us to unpack microfinance mechanisms in a systematic way. We find that risk-taking broadly conforms to predicted patterns, but that behavior is safer than optimal. The results help to explain why pioneering microfinance institutions have been moving away from group-based contracts.
Tipo: | Working or Discussion Paper
Idioma: | Inglês

Identificador:

22722

http://purl.umn.edu/28520

Editor: | AgEcon Search

Relação:

Yale University&gt;Economic Growth Center&gt;Center Discussion Papers

Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper No. 936

Formato:

46

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