Data/hora: 09/06/2024 16:09:11

Provedor de dados: | 31
País: | United States
Título: | CONTRACT INCENTIVES AND EXCESSIVE NITROGEN USE IN AGRICULTURE
Autores: | Preckel,   Paul V.; Shively,   Gerald E.; Baker,   Timothy G.; Chu,   Mei-Chin; Burrell,   Jessica Eide.
Data: | 2004-01-05
Ano: | 2000
Palavras-chave: | Crop Production/Industries.
Resumo: | This study examines incentives for input use under tournament contracts. We analyze implications of contract design for nitrate-based environmental externalities generated by agricultural producers. Outcomes are compared from contracts awarded by tournament to those from fixed-payment contracts. Our findings show contract insecurity can distort input use. The model developed in this analysis is applied to a region of the U.S. where tournament-based production is prevalent and groundwater contamination is a problem. We find contract insecurity increases nitrogen use by about 12%, resulting in a 17% increase in nitrate leaching. Implications for contract modification to reduce environmental externalities while maintaining contract incentives are discussed.
Tipo: | Journal Article
Idioma: | Inglês

Identificador:

12093

http://purl.umn.edu/30902

Editor: | AgEcon Search
Relação: | Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics&gt;Volume 25, Number 02, December 2000

Formato:

17

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