Data/hora: 09/06/2024 02:51:49

Provedor de dados: 	Research in Agricultural & Applied Economics (AgEcon Searh)	
País: 	United States	
Título: 	You Can Pick Your Friends, But You Need to Watch Them: Loan Screening and Enforcement in a Referrals Field Experiment	
Autores: 	Bryan,   Gharad; Karlan,   Dean S.; Zinman,   Jonathan.	
Data: 	2012-03-09	
Ano: 	2012	
Palavras-chave: 	Information asymmetries; Credit market failures; Peer networks; Social capital; Social networks; Consumer/Household Economics; Financial Economics; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; International Development; C93; D12; D14; D82; O12; O16.	
Resumo: 	We examine a randomized trial that allows separate identification of peer screening and enforcement of credit contracts. A South African microlender offered half its clients a bonus for referring a friend who repaid a loan. For the remaining clients, the bonus was conditional on loan approval. After approval, the repayment incentive was removed from half the referrers in the first group and added for half those in the second. We find large enforcement effects, a $12 (100 Rand) incentive reduced default by 10 percentage points from a base of 20%. In contrast, we find no evidence of screening.	
Tipo: 	Working Paper	
Idioma: 	Inglês	
Identificador: 	http://purl.umn.edu/121674	
Relação: 	Yale University&gt;Economic Growth Center&gt;Center Discussion Papers

Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper

1009	
Formato: 	38