Data/hora: 11/06/2024 15:27:01

Provedor de dados: | 31
País: | United States
Título: | The Quality-Quantity Trade-off in the Principal-Agent Framework
Autores: | Olmos,   Marta Fernandez; Martinez,   Jorge Rosell.
Data: | 2011-12-05
Ano: | 2011
Palavras-chave: | Quality; Quantity; Trade-off; Incentive contract; Principal-agent framework; Uncertainty; Agribusiness; Agricultural and Food Policy; D86.
Resumo: | This paper uses the principal-agent theory to analytically investigate the optimal incentive-based compensation contract that a processor should offer to a grower performing efforts in quantity and quality. In this process, we contribute to the substantive literature on multi-task principal-agent models by analyzing the quality-quantity trade-off and studying the implications of such a relationship in the principal-agent framework. One striking result of these effects is that, under appropriate incentive-based grower’s compensation, the processor may encourage grower’s effort in quality without crowding out grower’s effort in quantity.
Tipo: | Article
Idioma: | Inglês
Identificador: | http://purl.umn.edu/118578
Relação: | Agricultural Economics Review&gt;Volume 11, Issue 1, January 2010
Formato: | 12