Data/hora: 01/06/2024 08:24:49

Provedor de dados: | Research in Agricultural & Applied Economics (AgEcon Searh)
País: | United States
Título: | International Environmental Agreements: Emissions trade, safety valves and escape clauses
Autores: | Karp,   Larry S.; Zhao,   Jinhua.
Data: | 2009-05-22
Ano: | 2009
Palavras-chave: | Kyoto Protocol; Escape clause; Emissions trade; Cost uncertainty; Participation game; International Environmental Agreement; Environmental Economics and Policy; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; Risk and Uncertainty; C72; H4; Q54.
Resumo: | We explain how the structure of multi-national or multi-regional environmental agreements affect their chance of success. Trade in emissions permits has ambiguous and in some cases surprising effects on both the equilibrium level of abatement, and on the ability to persuade nations or regions to participate in environmental agreements. An escape clause policy and a safety valve policy have essentially the same properties when membership in environmental agreement is pre-determined, but they create markedly different effects on the incentives to join such an agreement. The two policies lead to a qualitative difference in the leverage that a potential member of the agreement exercises on other members.
Tipo: | Working or Discussion Paper
Idioma: | Inglês
Identificador: | http://purl.umn.edu/51611

Relação:

University of California, Berkeley&gt;Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics&gt;CUDARE Working Papers

CUDARE Working Papers

1084

Formato: | 30