Data/hora: 03/06/2024 10:52:14

Provedor de dados: 	31	
País: 	United States	
Título: 	The Public Management of Risk: Separating Ex Ante and Ex Post Monitors	
Autores: 	Hiriart,   Yolande; Martimort,   David; Pouyet,   Jerome.	
Data: 	2011-01-05	
Ano: 	2010	
Palavras-chave: 	Risk Regulation; Monitoring; Capture; Integration; Separation; Financial Economics; L51; D82.	
Resumo: 	When a firm undertakes risky activities, the conflict between social and private incentives to implement safety care requires public intervention which can take the form of both monetary incentives but also ex ante or ex post monitoring, i.e., before or after an accident occurs. We delineate the optimal scope of monitoring depending on whether public monitors are benevolent or corruptible. We show that separating the ex ante and the ex post monitors increases the likelihood of ex post investigation, helps prevent capture and improves welfare.	
Tipo: 	Working or Discussion Paper	
Idioma: 	Inglês	
Identificador: 	http://purl.umn.edu/98454	
Relação: 	Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)&gt;Institutions and Markets Papers

IM

144.2010	
Formato: 	35