Data/hora: 04/06/2024 10:52:55

Provedor de dados: | 31
País: | United States
Título: | GAME MODELS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN AN OPEN ECONOMY
Autores: | Batabyal,   Amitrajeet A.
Data: | 1998-04-29
Ano: | 1995
Palavras-chave: | Environmental; Policy; Open; Economy; Game; Environmental Economics and Policy; D62; F13; Q28.
Resumo: | In this paper we study some aspects of the question of international environmental regulation from a game theoretic perspective. We address two broad questions. First, we examine the circumstances under which the pursuit of unilateral environmental policy by a country in a Stackelberg game will make that country worse off. Second, we study the effects of environmental regulation by means of alternate price control instruments in a Stackelberg game where there is transboundary pollution. We find that there are plausible theoretical circumstances in which the pursuit of unilateral environmental policy is not a good idea. Further, we show that in choosing between alternate pollution control instruments, national governments typically face a tradeoff between instruments which correct more distortions but are costly to implement and instruments which correct fewer distortions but are less costly to implement. In particular, we obtain a dominance result for a tariff policy; this result favors the use of tariffs from an informational standpoint alone.  Published in Annals of Regional Science 30 (2, 1996): 185-200.
Tipo: | Working or Discussion Paper
Idioma: | Inglês

Identificador:

622

http://purl.umn.edu/28364

Editor: | AgEcon Search

Relação:

Utah State University&gt;Economics Department&gt;Economics Research Institute, ERI Study Papers

ERI Study Paper 95-11

Formato:

28

application/pdf