Registro completo |
Provedor de dados: |
AgEcon
|
País: |
United States
|
Título: |
Incentive Compatible Mechanism Design for Stated Choice Surveys: A Multiple Alternative Choice Case
|
Autores: |
Das, Chhandita
Anderson, Christopher M.
|
Data: |
2007-06-27
|
Ano: |
2007
|
Palavras-chave: |
Stated choice survey
Mechanism design
Public goods experiment
Demand and Price Analysis
C42
C72
C92
D02
H41
Q51
|
Resumo: |
Paper removed by author 02/04/09.
Stated choice surveys, hypothetical or real, have been a valuable tool in eliciting individual preferences for public goods and services for decades. However, the incentive structure of these questions remains to be a potential source of bias in welfare measurements. We have designed a dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism that removes the incentives to free-ride in real money questions. In a previous research (Das and Anderson, 2007), we discussed a similar incentive compatible mechanism design for a binary choice case and in this paper we extend our theory to a multiple alternative choice case. We prove that in this mechanism truthfully answering the stated choice questions is an individual's dominant strategy. We use experimental tools to verify the model, and also evaluate its performance with respect to alternative demand revelation mechanisms. For our experimental demonstration, we limit the choice set to four choice alternatives. Although, overall our incentive compatible mechanism for multiple alternative choice case perform quite satisfactorily, it fails to perform as well as the binary choice case.
|
Tipo: |
Conference Paper or Presentation
|
Idioma: |
Inglês
|
Identificador: |
26292
http://purl.umn.edu/9823
|
Editor: |
AgEcon Search
|
Relação: |
American Agricultural Economics Association>2007 Annual Meeting, July 29-August 1, 2007, Portland, Oregon
Selected Paper 174798
|
Formato: |
29
application/pdf
|
|