| Registro completo |
| Provedor de dados: |
AgEcon
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| País: |
United States
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| Título: |
The GATT Negotiations and US/EC Agricultural Policies Solutions to Noncooperative Games
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| Autores: |
Johnson, Martin
Roe, Terry L.
Mahe, Louis Adrien Pascal
|
| Data: |
2008-01-14
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| Ano: |
1989
|
| Palavras-chave: |
Agricultural and Food Policy
International Relations/Trade
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| Resumo: |
Countries cooperate in negotiating treaties. However, treaty compliance is noncooperative; signatories comply with treaties only if compliance leaves them better off than noncompliance. US and EC agricultural policies of 1986 are modeled through a noncooperative game. Bilateral treaties, formalizations of Nash Equilibria, are presented which improve US and EC welfare.
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| Tipo: |
Working or Discussion Paper
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| Idioma: |
Inglês
|
| Identificador: |
28229
http://purl.umn.edu/7491
|
| Editor: |
AgEcon Search
|
| Relação: |
University of Minnesota>Economic Development Center>Bulletins
Bulletin 89-2
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| Formato: |
16
application/pdf
|
