| Registro completo |
| Provedor de dados: |
31
|
| País: |
United States
|
| Título: |
Tradable Permits vs Ecological Dumping
|
| Autores: |
Antoniou, Fabio
Hatzipanayotou, Panos
Koundouri, Phoebe
|
| Data: |
2010-03-15
|
| Ano: |
2010
|
| Palavras-chave: |
Strategic Environmental Policy
Tradable Permits
Race to the top
Environmental Economics and Policy
Q58
F12
F18
|
| Resumo: |
In this paper we examine an alternative policy scenario, where governments allow polluting firms to trade permits in a strategic environmental policy model. We demonstrate, among other things, that with no market power in the permits market, governments of the exporting firms do not have an incentive to under-regulate pollution in order to become more competitive. This strategic effect is reversed and leads to a welfare level closer to the cooperative one and strictly higher to that when permits are non-tradable. Allowing for market power in the permits market, the incentive to under-regulate pollution re-appears regardless of whether permits are tradable or not. With tradable permits, however, the incentive to under-regulate pollution is comparatively weaker relative to the case of non-tradable permits. This entails potential benefits for the exporting firms and countries since the prisoners’ dilemma is moderated.
|
| Tipo: |
Working or Discussion Paper
|
| Idioma: |
Inglês
|
| Identificador: |
http://purl.umn.edu/59374
|
| Relação: |
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)>Sustainable Development Papers
SD
2.2010
|
| Formato: |
31
|
