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Provedor de dados:  AgEcon
País:  United States
Título:  Optimal Design of a Voluntary Green Payment Program Under Asymmetric Information
Autores:  Wu, JunJie
Babcock, Bruce A.
Data:  2006-08-03
Ano:  1995
Palavras-chave:  Environmental Economics and Policy
Resumo:  Green payment programs, where the government pays farmers directly for environmental benefits, have been proposed as an alternative to the current method of achieving environmental benefits by restricting farming practices in exchange for deficiency payments. This paper presents a voluntary green payment program using the principles of mechanism design under asymmetric information. The information asymmetry arises because government knows only the distribution of individual farmers' production situations, rather than farm-specific information. The program is applied to irrigated corn production in the Oklahoma Panhandle, where nitrogen fertilizer is a nonpoint source of pollution. We demonstrate empirically that a green payment program can increase farm income, decrease pollution, and increase the net social value of corn production relative to current deficiency payment programs.
Tipo:  Working or Discussion Paper
Idioma:  Inglês
Identificador:  23243
Editor:  AgEcon Search
Relação:  Iowa State University>Center for Agricultural and Rural Development>CARD Working Paper Series
CARD Working Paper 95-WP 131
Formato:  23


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