Consulta: creatorFacets:"Chambolle,   Claire"
Registros recuperados: 3
Data/hora: 11/06/2024 12:42:35

Guaranteed Minimum Price Contracts for Some, an Insurance for Others?
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Chambolle,   Claire; Poret,   Sylvaine.
This paper analyzes the impact of guaranteed minimum price contracts between sub-groups of farmers and a fair trade manufacturer on the spot market price. We focus on the fair trade concept in the coffee supply chain as an example. We analyze a three level vertical chain gathering perfectly competitive farmers upstream who offer their raw product to manufacturers who then sell finished products to a downstream retailer. Without fair trade, all the raw product is sold on the spot market. When a sub-group of farmers benefit from a guaranteed minimum price contract offered by a fair trade certifier, we show that farmers outside of this fair trade agreement may also benefit from a higher spot market price in cases of a limited overproduction.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Guaranteed Minimum Price Contracts; Fair Trade; Vertical Chain.; Demand and Price Analysis; International Relations/Trade.
Ano: 2008
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/44134

Certification of Origin and Brands Competition
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Chambolle,   Claire; Giraud-Heraud,   Eric.
We analyse the competition in quality and quantity between a foreign firm and a domestic firm. The domestic firm can belong to a certification of origin, whereas its rival uses a pure brand strategy. We will show how the certification can allow the domestic firm to position itself as a high quality producer and improve the average quality of the products offered on the market. If, however, the certified firm offers the low quality good, the certification can permit it to guarantee a higher profit than that of its competitor and to improve the consumers' surplus by favouring product standardisation.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Certification of origin; Quality; International competition; Demand and Price Analysis; L13; F12; F14.
Ano: 2002
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24976

BUYER POWER THROUGH PRODUCER'S DIFFERENTIATION
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Chambolle,   Claire; Villas-Boas,   Sofia Berto.
This paper shows that retailers may choose to offer products differentiated in quality to consumers, not to relax downstream competition, but to improve their buyer power in the negotiation with their supplier. We consider a simple vertical industry where two producers sell products differentiated in quality to two retailers who operate in separated markets. In the game, first retailers choose which product to carry, then each retailer and her chosen producer bargain over the terms of a two-part tariff contract and retailers finally choose the quantities. When upstream production costs are convex, the share of the total profits going to the retailer would be higher if they choose to differentiate. We thus isolate the wish to differentiate as "only" due to...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Buyer Power; Product line; Differentiation; Marketing; L13; L42.
Ano: 2007
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6866