Consulta: creatorFacets:"Konishi,   Yoshifumi"
Registros recuperados: 6
Data/hora: 12/06/2024 15:46:19

What are the Economic Health Costs of Non-Action in Controlling Toxic Water Pollution?
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Easter,   K. William; Konishi,   Yoshifumi; Raggi,   Meri; Viaggi,   Davide.
This paper identifies information that may be important in determining the benefits of preventing toxic water contamination (or equivalently cost of nonaction) when a given toxification occurs. It attempts to identify information and behavior issues that need to be considered when we estimate benefits and weigh them against the costs of removing toxins. This paper also provides “scenarios” for three toxic pollutants that are found in water bodies. We make use of two alternatives--one for developing countries and the other for developed countries--to demonstrate, with specific examples of arsenic, mercury and Atrazine, how benefit estimates and control policies vary with different assumptions concerning behavior/information and type of chemical...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Environment &amp; the Developing World; Hydrology; Transport Geography; Environmental Economics and Policy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2006
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6656

Estimating Economic Health Costs of Not Controlling Toxic Water Pollution
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Easter,   K. William; Konishi,   Yoshifumi.
The purpose of this paper is to determine what types of information may be important in determining the welfare benefits of preventing toxic water contamination when a given type of toxification occurs (or is likely to occur) in a given setting. It attempts to identify information and behavior issues that need to be considered when policy makers and others wish to obtain reasonable estimates of welfare benefits and weigh them against the economic costs of removing toxins. This paper also provides reasonable "scenarios" for three toxic pollutants that are found in water bodies (surface water or groundwater). We make use of two country alternatives--one in developing countries and the other in developed countries--to demonstrate, with specific examples of...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Welfare costs; Arsenic; Mercury; Atrazine; Information; Water; Environmental Economics and Policy; Health Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2006
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25768

Environmental Labeling and Technology Adoption in the Presence of Strategic Interactions
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Konishi,   Yoshifumi.
This manuscript analyzes the effect of binary ecolabeling on the strategic competition of Cournot duopolists in environmental technology and the output market. Under binary labeling, firms' abatement technologies are not directly observable by consumers but are certified if they satisfy preset ecological standards. Given this asymmetry, I set up the regulator's problem as one of choosing a technology standard, or "cutoff," in emissions per unit of output, below which all abatement efficiency levels are certified. The regulatory authority faces a trade-off in choosing the socially optimal cutoff: The regulator would like to raise the standard to reduce emissions but needs to lower it in order to induce technology adoption. There are three important...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Ecolabeling; Emissions; Product differentiation; Technology adoption; Environmental Economics and Policy; Industrial Organization; D43; L13; Q53; Q58.
Ano: 2007
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/9949

Value of Information and Averting Behavior: The Case of Toxic Water Contamination
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Konishi,   Yoshifumi; Coggins,   Jay S.
Little theoretical work has been done previously on the welfare valuation of changes in price and quality when consumers are imperfectly informed. The presence of imperfect information is particularly important in the analysis of averting behaviors. We develop a theoretical welfare measure, called quasi-compensating variation, as a natural extension of compensating variation (CV). We show that this welfare measure offers not only a money metric of the "value of information", but also a means to appropriately evaluate the welfare effects of various policies when consumers are imperfectly informed of water contamination. With a numerical example and our decomposition results (Propositions 2 and 3), we demonstrate that (i) the value of information could...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Consumer/Household Economics.
Ano: 2006
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21395

Can Rural Communities Comply with the New Arsenic Standard for Drinking Water?
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Cho,   Yongsung; Konishi,   Yoshifumi; Easter,   K. William.
Our primary concern in this paper is to determine to what extent small communities have difficulty meeting the new stricter 2001 standard for arsenic levels in their drinking water. To do this we survey water users in rural Minnesota communities that had arsenic levels in their water supply exceeding 10 g/L during 2001-2006. Our survey results show that after obtaining complete information concerning the arsenic levels in their drinking water consumers with relatively low levels of arsenic were willing to pay $8-9 annually, while those with high levels of arsenic are willing to pay $15-17 annually. We also found that consumer’s willingness to pay (WTP) didn’t vary by community size. Thus, we conclude that compared to compliance costs ($58-327 per capita...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Community/Rural/Urban Development; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2007
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7353

"Private" Provision of Publicly Useful Information: An Empirical Analysis of Public Notification Rules for Safe Drinking Water Act
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Adachi,   Kenji; Konishi,   Yoshifumi.
Providing quality information on health-threatening contamination incidences can improve consumer welfare, because the consumers can, and often do, take self-protective actions given the information provided. Unfortunately, important contamination information often comes from private or quasi-private sources and the distinction between private and public information is also sometimes ambiguous. Thus, the regulatory authority may need to manage “private” incentives of providing publicly useful information. There is no lack of literature arguing that supply of public goods is smaller than optimal when provision of those goods are in the hands of private agents seeking their own economic rents. The same argument seems to apply here --- private provision of...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2007
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/9901