Consulta: creatorFacets:"Stranlund,   John K."
Registros recuperados: 31
Data/hora: 16/06/2024 09:00:45

An Investigation of Voluntary Discovery and Disclosure of Environmental Violations Using Laboratory Experiments
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Murphy,   James J.; Stranlund,   John K.
This paper uses laboratory experiments to test individual responses to policies that seek to encourage firms to voluntarily discover and disclose violations of environmental standards. We find that while it is possible to motivate a significant number of voluntary disclosures without adversely affecting environmental quality, this result is sensitive to both the fine for disclosed violations and the assumption that firms know their compliance status without cost.  When firms have to expend resources to determine their compliance status, motivating a significant number of violation disclosures yields worse environmental quality. Finally, relative to conventional enforcement, disclosure polices will result in more violations being sanctioned, but fewer of...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2005
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14519

Bankruptcy Risk and Imperfectly Enforced Emissions Taxes
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Stranlund,   John K.; Zhang,   Wei.
Under favorable but reasonable conditions, an imperfectly enforced emissions tax produces the efficient allocation of individual emissions control; aggregate emissions are independent of whether enforcement of the tax is sufficient to induce the full compliance of firms, and differences in individual violations are independent of firm-level differences. All of these desirable characteristics disappear when some firms under an emissions tax risk bankruptcy—the allocation of emissions control is inefficient, imperfect enforcement causes higher aggregate emissions, and financially insecure firms choose higher violations.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Bankruptcy; Emissions Taxes; Limited Liability; Environmental Economics and Policy; Public Economics; Risk and Uncertainty; L51; Q28; Q58.
Ano: 2008
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/42127

A Safety Valve for Emissions Trading
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Stranlund,   John K.
This paper considers the optimal design of an emissions trading program that includes a safety valve tax that allows pollution sources to escape the emissions cap imposed by the aggregate supply of emissions permits. I demonstrate that an optimal hybrid emissions trading/emissions tax policy involves a permit supply that is strictly less than under a pure emissions trading scheme and a safety valve tax that exceeds the optimal pure emissions tax as long as expected marginal damage is an increasing function. While the expected level of emissions under a hybrid policy may be more or less than under pure emissions trading or a pure emissions tax, under the assumption that uncertainty about aggregate marginal abatement costs is symmetric the most likely...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Emissions Taxes; Emissions Trading; Uncertainty; Safety Valve; Hybrid Emissions Control; Environmental Economics and Policy; Public Economics; Risk and Uncertainty; L51; Q28.
Ano: 2009
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/53125

The Regulatory Choice of Noncompliance in Emissions Trading Programs
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Stranlund,   John K.
This paper addresses the following question: To achieve a fixed aggregate emissions target cost-effectively, should emissions trading programs be designed and implemented to achieve full compliance, or does allowing a certain amount of noncompliance reduce the costs of reaching the emissions target?  The total costs of achieving the target consist of aggregate abatement costs, monitoring costs, and the expected costs of collecting penalties from noncompliant firms. Under common assumptions, I show that allowing noncompliance is cost-effective only if violations are enforced with an increasing marginal penalty. However, one can design a policy that induces full compliance with a constant marginal penalty that meets the aggregate emissions target at lower...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2006
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14520

A Laboratory Investigation of Compliance Behavior under Tradable Emissions Rights: Implications for Targeted Enforcement
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Murphy,   James J.; Stranlund,   John K.
This paper uses laboratory experiments to test the theoretical observations that both the violations of competitive risk-neutral firms and the marginal effectiveness of increased enforcement across firms are independent of differences in their abatement costs and their initial allocations of permits. This conclusion has important implications for enforcing emissions trading programs because it suggests that regulators have no justification for targeting their enforcement effort based on firm-level characteristics. Consistent with the theory, we find that subjects' violations were independent of parametric differences in their abatement costs. However, those subjects that were predicted to buy permits tended to have higher violation levels than those who...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2005
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14513

Should we impose emissions taxes that firms evade?
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Stranlund,   John K.
Most of the theoretical literature on enforcing environmental policies focuses on situations in which pollution sources are noncompliant. However, some recent work suggests that these situations will very often involve suboptimal policy designs. Thus, the circumstances under which it is efficient to implement policies that do not motivate full compliance appear to be more limited than most of the literature would imply.  In this paper, I identify several circumstances under which regulators may conserve enforcement costs by implementing emissions taxes that firms evade. I demonstrate that a regulator can use a firm’s tax evasion to reduce monitoring effort, but only if its monitoring strategy can be made an increasing function of the firm’s emissions, if...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Compliance; Enforcement; Emissions Taxes; Monitoring; Sanctions; Uncertainty; Environmental Economics and Policy; Public Economics; L51; Q58.
Ano: 2010
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/93967

Centralized and Decentralized Management of Local Common Pool Resources in the Developing World: Experimental Evidence from Fishing Communities in Colombia
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Velez,   Maria Alejandra; Murphy,   James J.; Stranlund,   John K.
This paper uses experimental data to test for a complementary relationship between formal regulations imposed on a community to conserve a local natural resource and nonbinding verbal agreements to do the same. Our experiments were conducted in the field in three regions of Colombia. Each group of five subjects played 10 rounds of an open access common pool resource game, and 10 additional rounds under one of five institutions— communication alone, two external regulations that differed by the level of enforcement, and communication combined with each of the two regulations. Our results suggest that the hypothesis of a complementary relationship between communication and external regulation is supported for some combinations of regions and regulations, but...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: International Development; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2006
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14532

Comparing the Effectiveness of Regulation and Pro-Social Emotions to Enhance Cooperation: Experimental Evidence from Fishing Communities in Colombia
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Lopez,   Maria Claudia; Murphy,   James J.; Spraggon,   John M.; Stranlund,   John K.
This paper presents the results from a series of framed field experiments conducted in fishing communities off the Caribbean coast of Colombia. The goal is to investigate the relative effectiveness of exogenous regulatory pressure and pro-social emotions in promoting cooperative behavior in a public goods context. The random public revelation of an individual’s contribution and its consequences for the rest of the group leads to significantly higher public good contributions and social welfare than regulatory pressure, even under regulations that are designed to motivate fully efficient contributions.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Public goods; Field experiments; Pro-social emotions; Social dilemma; Regulation; Enforcement.; Environmental Economics and Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; C93; H41; Q20; Q28.
Ano: 2009
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/53126

The Endogenous Formation of Coalitions to Provide Public Goods: Theory and Experimental Evidence
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: McEvoy,   David M.; Cherry,   Todd L.; Stranlund,   John K.
This paper examines the endogenous formation of coalitions that provide public goods in which players implement a minimum participation requirement before deciding whether to join. We demonstrate theoretically that payoff-maximizing players will vote to implement efficient participation requirements and these coalitions will form. However, we also demonstrate that if some players are averse to inequality they can cause inefficient outcomes. Inequality-averse players can limit free riding by implementing larger than efficient coalitions or by blocking efficient coalitions from forming. We test the theory with experimental methods and observe individual behavior and coalition formation consistent with a model of inequality-averse players.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Public goods; Coalition formation; Inequality aversion; Participation requirement; Experiments; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Public Economics; C92; H41.
Ano: 2011
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/102265

AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE BEHAVIOR IN EMISSIONS TRADING PROGRAMS: SOME PRELIMINARY RESULTS
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Murphy,   James J.; Stranlund,   John K.
While there is a substantial body of economic theory about compliance and enforcement in emissions trading programs, and readily available information about how existing emissions trading programs are enforced, there are no empirical analyses of the determinants of compliance decisions in emissions trading programs. This paper contains preliminary results from laboratory experiments designed to examine compliance behavior in emissions trading programs.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2003
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/22039

The Optimal Pricing of Pollution When Enforcement is Costly
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Stranlund,   John K.; Chavez,   Carlos A.; Villena,   Mauricio G.
We consider the pricing of a uniformly mixed pollutant when enforcement is costly with a model of optimal, possibly firm-specific, emissions taxes and their enforcement. We argue that optimality requires an enforcement strategy that induces full compliance by every firm. This holds whether or not regulators have complete information about firms’ abatement costs, the costs of monitoring them for compliance, or the costs of collecting penalties from noncompliant firms. Moreover, ignoring several unrealistic special cases, optimality requires discriminatory emissions taxes except when regulators are unable to observe firms’ abatement costs, the costs of monitoring individual firms, or any firm-specific characteristic that is known to be jointly distributed...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Compliance; Enforcement; Emissions Taxes; Monitoring; Asymmetric Information; Uncertainty; Environmental Economics and Policy; L51; Q58.
Ano: 2007
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7387

Costly Enforcement of Voluntary Environmental Agreements with Industries
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: McEvoy,   David M.; Stranlund,   John K.
Although the theoretical literature on the performance of voluntary approaches to environmental protection has progressed quite far in the last decade, no one has rigorously addressed the obvious point that even voluntary emissions control policies must be enforced. This paper examines the consequences of the need for costly enforcement of voluntary environmental agreements with industries on the ability of these agreements to meet regulatory objectives, the levels of industry participation with these agreements, and the relative efficiency of voluntary and regulatory approaches. We find that enforcement costs that are borne by the members of a voluntary emissions control agreement limit the circumstances under which an agreement can form in place of an...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Voluntary agreements; Self-enforcing agreements; Emissions tax; Enforcement; Environmental Economics and Policy; L51; Q58.
Ano: 2007
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7382

Securing the Border from Invasives:  Robust Inspections Under Severe Uncertainty
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Moffitt,   L. Joe; Stranlund,   John K.; Osteen,   Craig D.
Two important features of agricultural quarantine inspections of shipping containers for invasive species at U.S. ports of entry are the general absence of economic considerations and the severe uncertainty that surrounds invasive species introductions. In this article, we propose and illustrate a method for determining an inspection monitoring protocol that addresses both issues. An inspection monitoring protocol is developed that is robust in maximizing the set of uncertain outcomes over which an economic performance criterion is achieved. The framework is applied to derive an alternative to Agricultural Quarantine Inspection (AQI) for shipments of fruits and vegetables as currently practiced at ports of entry in the United States.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Inspection; Invasive Species; Uncertainty; Agricultural and Food Policy; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Public Economics; Risk and Uncertainty; Q18; Q57; D81.
Ano: 2009
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/53127

An Experimental Analysis of Compliance in Dynamic Emissions Markets
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Stranlund,   John K.; Murphy,   James J.; Spraggon,   John M.
Two important design elements for emission trading programs are whether and to what extent firms are able to bank emissions permits, and how these programs are to be enforced. In this paper we present results from laboratory emissions markets designed to investigate enforcement and compliance when these markets allow permit banking.  Banking is motivated by a decrease in the aggregate permit supply in the middle of multi-period trading sessions. Consistent with theoretical insights, our experiments suggest that high permit violation penalties have little deterrence value in dynamic emissions markets, and that the main challenge of enforcing these programs is to motivate truthful self-reports of emissions.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Compliance; Enforcement; Emissions trading; Laboratory experiments; Permit markets; Permit banking; Environmental Economics and Policy; Public Economics; C91; L51; Q58.
Ano: 2010
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/93966

Enforcing 'Self-Enforcing' International Environmental Agreements
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: McEvoy,   David M.; Stranlund,   John K.
Theoretical analyses of international environmental agreements (IEAs) have typically employed the concept of self-enforcing agreements to predict the number of parties to such an agreement. The term self-enforcing, however, is a bit misleading. The concept refers to the stability of cooperative agreements, not to enforcing these agreements once they are in place.   Most analyses of IEAs simply ignore the issue of enforcing compliance. In this paper we analyze a static IEA game in which parties to an agreement finance an independent enforcement body with the power to monitor the parties'’ compliance to the terms of an IEA and impose penalties in cases of noncompliance. This approach is broadly consistent with the enforcement mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2006
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21403

Controlling Urban Air Pollution Caused by Households: Uncertainty, Prices, and Income
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Chavez,   Carlos A.; Stranlund,   John K.; Gomez,   Walter.
We examine the control of air pollution caused by households burning wood for heating and cooking in the developing world.  Since the problem is one of controlling emissions from nonpoint sources, regulations are likely to be directed at household choices of wood consumption and combustion technologies. Moreover, these choices are subtractions from, or contributions to, the pure public good of air quality. Consequently, the efficient policy design is not independent of the distribution of household income. Since it is unrealistic to assume that environmental authorities can make lump sum income transfers part of control policies, efficient control of air pollution caused by wood consumption entails a higher tax on wood consumption and a higher subsidy for...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Efficiency; Urban air pollution; Nonpoint pollution; Environmental policy; Uncertainty; Environmental Economics and Policy; Public Economics; Risk and Uncertainty; L51; H23; Q28.
Ano: 2010
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/93964

OPTIMAL NONCOMPLIANCE IN EMISSIONS TRADING PROGRAMS
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Stranlund,   John K.
This paper characterizes optimal noncompliance for an emissions trading policy that seeks to achieve a given aggregate emissions target at least cost. The total costs of achieving the target consist of aggregate abatement costs, monitoring costs, and the expected costs of collecting penalties from noncompliant firms. Optimal noncompliance depends in large measure on whether the marginal penalty for individual violations is increasing or constant. The primary result of this work is that any policy that achieves an aggregate emissions target with a linearly increasing marginal penalty, regardless of whether it involves perfect or imperfect compliance, is more costly than an alternative policy that induces perfect compliance with a constant marginal penalty.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2004
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14508

Bankruptcy Risk and the Performance of Tradable Permit Markets
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Stranlund,   John K.; Zhang,   Wei.
We study the impact of bankruptcy risk on markets for tradable environmental and natural resource permits. We find that firms that risk bankruptcy demand more permits than if they were financially secure. Consequently, bankruptcy risk in a competitive market for tradable property rights causes an inefficient distribution of individual choices among regulated firms. Moreover, the equilibrium distribution of permits is not independent of the initial distribution of permits. In fact, the inefficiency that is associated with bankruptcy risk is mitigated if financially insecure firms are given a larger share of the initial allocation of permits.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Bankruptcy; Tradable permits; Permit markets; Environmental Economics and Policy; L51; Q28; Q58.
Ano: 2007
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7384

ENFORCING TRANSFERABLE PERMIT SYSTEMS IN THE PRESENCE OF TRANSACTION COSTS
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Stranlund,   John K.; Chavez,   Carlos A.
In this paper we examine the impacts of transaction costs on enforcing a transferable emissions permit system.  We derive an enforcement strategy with a self-reporting requirement that achieves complete compliance in a cost-effective manner.  In the absence of transaction costs targeted enforcement-the practice of monitoring some firms more closely than others-is neither necessary nor desirable. In the presence of constant marginal transaction costs, buyers of permits should be monitored more closely than sellers, but within groups of buyers and sellers monitoring should be uniform.  When marginal transaction costs are not constant, effective monitoring will depend on whether a firm is a buyer or seller, its demand for permits relative to its initial...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2004
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14527

Imperfect Enforcement of Emissions Trading and Industry Welfare: A Laboratory Investigation
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Stranlund,   John K.; Murphy,   James J.; Spraggon,   John M.
This paper uses laboratory experiments to investigate the performance of emission permit markets when compliance is imperfectly enforced. In particular we examine deviations in observed aggregate payoffs and expected penalties from those derived from a model of risk-neutral payoff-maximizing firms. We find that the experimental emissions markets were reasonably efficient at allocating individual emission control choices despite imperfect enforcement and significant noncompliance. However, violations and expected penalties were lower than predicted when these are predicted to be high, but were about the same as predicted values when these values were predicted to be low.  Thus, although a standard model of compliance with emissions trading programs tends to...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Enforcement; Compliance; Emissions trading; Permit markets; Pollution; Laboratory experiments; Environmental Economics and Policy; Public Economics; C91; L51; Q58.
Ano: 2008
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/42124

Within and Between Group Variation of Individual Strategies in Common Pool Resources: Evidence from Field Experiments
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Velez,   Maria Alejandra; Murphy,   James J.; Stranlund,   John K.
With data from framed common pool resource experiments conducted with artisanal fishing communities in Colombia, we estimate a hierarchical linear model to investigate within-group and between-group variation in individual harvest strategies across several institutions. Our results suggest that communication serves to effectively coordinate individual strategies within groups, but that these coordinated strategies vary considerably across groups. In contrast, weakly enforced regulatory restrictions on individual harvests (as well as unregulated open access) produce significant variation in the individual strategies within groups, but these strategies are roughly replicated across groups so that there is little between-group variation.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2006
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14504

Enforcing 'Self-Enforcing' International Environmental Agreements
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: McEvoy,   David M.; Stranlund,   John K.
Theoretical analyses of international environmental agreements (IEAs) have typically employed the concept of self-enforcing agreements to predict the number of parties to such an agreement. The term self-enforcing, however, is a bit misleading. The concept refers to the stability of cooperative agreements, not to enforcing these agreements once they are in place.   Most analyses of IEAs simply ignore the issue of enforcing compliance by parties to the terms of an agreement. In this paper we analyze an IEA game in which parties to an agreement finance an independent enforcement body with the power to monitor the parties' compliance to the terms of the IEA and impose penalties in cases of noncompliance. This approach is broadly consistent with the...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy; International Relations/Trade.
Ano: 2006
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14537

On the Production of Homeland Security Under True Uncertainty
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Stranlund,   John K.; Field,   Barry C.
Homeland security against possible terrorist attacks involves making decisions under true uncertainty. Not only are we ignorant of the form, place, and time of potential terrorist attacks, we are also largely ignorant of the likelihood of these attacks. In this paper, we conceptualize homeland security under true uncertainty as society's immunity to unacceptable losses. We illustrate and analyze the consequences of this notion of security with a simple model of allocating a fixed budget for homeland security to defending the pathways through which a terrorist may launch an attack and to mitigating the damage from an attack that evades this defense. In this problem, immunity is the range of uncertainty about the likelihood of an attack within which the...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Risk and Uncertainty.
Ano: 2006
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14505

Price-Based vs. Quantity-Based Environmental Regulation under Knightian Uncertainty: An Info-Gap Robust Satisficing Perspective
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Stranlund,   John K.; Ben-Haim,   Yakov.
Conventional wisdom among environmental economists is that the relative slopes of the marginal social benefit and marginal social cost functions determine whether a price-based or quantity-based environmental regulation leads to higher expected social welfare. We revisit the choice between price-based vs. quantity-based environmental regulation under Knightian uncertainty; that is, when uncertainty cannot be modeled with known probability distributions. Under these circumstances, the policy objective cannot be to maximize the expected net benefits of emissions control. Instead, we evaluate an emissions tax and an aggregate abatement standard in terms of maximizing the range of uncertainty under which the welfare loss from error in the estimates of the...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy; Risk and Uncertainty.
Ano: 2006
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14528

Risk Aversion and Compliance in Markets for Pollution Control
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Stranlund,   John K.
This paper examines the effects of risk aversion on compliance choices in markets for pollution control. A firm's decision to be compliant or not is independent of its manager's risk preference. However, noncompliant firms with risk averse managers will have lower violations than otherwise identical firms with risk neutral managers. The violations of noncompliant firms with risk averse managers are independent of differences in their benefits from emissions and their initial allocations of permits if and only if their managers' utility functions exhibit constant absolute risk aversion. However, firm-level characteristics do impact violation choices when managers have coefficients of absolute risk aversion that are increasing or decreasing in profit levels....
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2006
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14522

The Problem of Maintaining Compliance within Stable Coalitions: Experimental Evidence
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: McEvoy,   David M.; Murphy,   James J.; Spraggon,   John M.; Stranlund,   John K.
This study examines the performance of stable cooperative coalitions that form to provide a public good when coalition members have the opportunity to not comply with their commitments. A stable coalition is one in which no member wishes to leave and no non-member wishes to join. To counteract the incentive to violate their commitments, coalition members fund a third-party enforcer. This leads to the theoretical conclusion that stable coalitions are larger (and provide more of a public good) when their members must finance enforcement relative to when compliance is ensured without the need for costly enforcement. However, our experiments reveal that giving coalition members the opportunity to violate their commitments while requiring them to finance...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Stable coalitions; Self-enforcing agreements; Compliance; Enforcement; Public goods; Environmental Economics and Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Public Economics; H41; C92.
Ano: 2008
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/42126

What Motivates Common Pool Resource Users? Experimental Evidence from the Field
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Velez,   Maria Alejandra; Stranlund,   John K.; Murphy,   James J.
This paper develops and tests several models of pure Nash strategies of individuals who extract from a common pool resource when they are motivated by a combination of self-interest and other motivations such as altruism, reciprocity, inequity aversion and conformism. We test whether an econometric summary of subjects' strategies is consistent with one of these motivations using data from a series of common pool resource experiments conducted in three regions of Colombia. As expected, average extraction levels are less than that predicted by a model of pure self-interest, but are nevertheless sub-optimal. Moreover, we find that a model of conformism with monotonically increasing best response functions best describes average strategies. Our empirical...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2005
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14535

DIRECT AND MARKET EFFECTS OF ENFORCING EMISSIONS TRADING PROGRAMS: AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Murphy,   James J.; Stranlund,   John K.
Since firms in an emissions trading program are linked together through a permit market, so too are their compliance choices. Thus, enforcement strategies for trading programs must account for not only the direct effects of enforcement on compliance and emissions decisions, but also the indirect effects that occur because changes in enforcement can induce changes in permit prices. This paper uses laboratory experiments to test for these direct and indirect market effects. Consistent with theoretical predictions, we find a direct effect of enforcement on individual violations, as well as a countervailing market effect through the permit price. Thus, the productivity of increased enforcement pressure to reduce noncompliance is partially offset by a...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2004
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14507

A Note on Emissions Taxes and Incomplete Information
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Chavez,   Carlos A.; Stranlund,   John K.
In contrast with what we perceive is the conventional wisdom about setting emissions taxes under uncertainty, we demonstrate that setting a uniform tax equal to expected marginal damage is not generally efficient under incomplete information about firms’ abatement costs and damages from pollution.  We show that efficient taxes will deviate from expected marginal damage if there is uncertainty about the slopes of the marginal abatement costs of regulated firms. Moreover, efficient emissions tax rates will vary across firms if a regulator can use observable firm-level characteristics to gain some information about how the firms’ marginal abatement costs vary.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Emissions Taxes; Incomplete Information; Uncertainty; Environmental Economics and Policy; Public Economics; Risk and Uncertainty; L51; Q28.
Ano: 2008
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/42129

Who Should Bear the Administrative Costs of an Emissions Tax?
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Stranlund,   John K.; Chavez,   Carlos A.
All environmental policies involve administrative costs, the costs of implementing and managing policies that extend beyond abatement costs. We examine theoretically the optimal distribution of these costs between the public and regulated sources of pollution. The distribution of administrative costs affects social welfare only if public funds are more expensive than private funds, or if the distribution of administrative costs affects the size of a regulated industry. If having the public take on a larger part of administrative costs increases the size of the industry and this does not lead to lower emissions for a given emissions tax, then it is optimal to make the pollution sources bear all of the administrative costs. A necessary, but not sufficient,...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Emissions Taxes; Pigouvian Taxes; Administrative Costs; Pollution Control; Environmental Economics and Policy; Public Economics; L51; Q58.
Ano: 2011
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/102266

Does Government Regulation Complement Existing Community Efforts to Support Cooperation? Evidence from Field Experiments in Colombia
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Lopez,   Maria Claudia; Murphy,   James J.; Spraggon,   John M.; Stranlund,   John K.
In this paper we describe a field experiment conducted among mollusk harvesters in a community on the Pacific Coast of Columbia.  The experiment is based on a standard linear public good and consists of two stages.  In the first stage we compare the ability of monetary and nonmonetary sanctions among community members to increase contributions to the public good.  In the second stage we add a government regulation with either a high or low sanction for noncompliance to community enforcement efforts. The results for the first stage are consistent with other comparisons of monetary and nonmonetary sanctions within groups; both led to higher contributions. The results from the second stage reveal that government regulations always complemented community...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Field experiments; Public goods; Government regulation; Community enforcement; Environmental Economics and Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Public Economics; C93; H41; Q2.
Ano: 2008
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/42128