Consulta: subjectFacets:"D82"
Registros recuperados: 68
Data/hora: 02/06/2024 01:01:05

Utilizing Contingent Claims to Improve the Management of CAFOs
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Gramig,   Benjamin M.; Skees,   Jerry R.; Black,   J. Roy.
We propose a market-based approach to reducing the environmental risk posed by concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs).  The dual problems of hidden information and hidden action faced by policymakers are considered alongside the competing incentives faced by the CAFO manager in a multiple principal-agent setting.  A new approach that uses insurance-like contracts is introduced by use of the specific example of a swine operation with a lagoon-based manure management system.  Index-based contingent claims contracts in tandem with third-party auditing and waste hauling options are introduced as a complement to regulatory frameworks designed to reduce negative externalities from production.
Tipo: Journal Article
Palavras-chave: Animal feeding operations; Asymmetric information; Environmental risk; Insurance; Public policy; Regulation; D82; G22; L51; Q18; Q25; Q28.
Ano: 2004
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43346

THE IMPACT OF INFORMATION ON LAND DEVELOPMENT: A DYNAMIC AND STOCHASTIC ANALYSIS
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Batabyal,   Amitrajeet A.
In a two-period model, economists such as K.J. Arrow, A.C. Fisher, and C. Henry, have shown that when development is both indivisible and irreversible, a developer who ignores the possibility of obtaining new information about the outcome of such development will invariably underestimate the benefits of preservation and hence favor development. In this note, I extend the AFH analysis in two directions. I model the land development problem in a dynamic framework, explicitly specifying an information production function. In such a setting, I then ask and answer the question concerning when development should take place.  Forthcoming in Journal of Environmental Management
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Development; Dynamic; Information; Uncertainty; Land Economics/Use; D82; Q20.
Ano: 1995
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28356

Corporate and Consumer Social Responsibilities: Label Regulations in the Lab
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Etile,   Fabrice; Teyssier,   Sabrina.
Although consumer attitudes toward corporate social responsibility are positive, socially responsible (SR) products are far from gaining significant market shares. Information asymmetries have been identified as one of the factor contributing to this attitude-behaviour gap, because social responsibility is a credence attribute. Signalling may remedy this market failure. We use an experimental posted offer market to investigate the impact of various regulatory requirements for labels on sellers’ choice to supply SR products and to signal it, and on buyers’ choice of ethical quality. Three treatments are tested: label certification by a third-party, “cheap-talk signalling” with random monitoring and with or without reputations. Individual social preferences...
Tipo: Presentation
Palavras-chave: Labels; Social responsibility; Social preferences; Separating equilibrium; Market game; Consumer/Household Economics; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Marketing; C92; D82; L15; M14.
Ano: 2011
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/120399

Do Farmers Value The Environment? Evidence from the Conservation Reserve Program Auctions
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Vukina,   Tomislav; Levy,   Armando; Marra,   Michele C.
The paper uses data from the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) auctions to elicit farmers' attitudes toward the environment by analyzing their bids. The CRP pays farmers to remove land from production and put it to a conservation use. An interesting aspect of these auctions is that winners are determined by a combination of low bids and environmental scores of individual plots. The results indicate that farmers condition their bids on the strength of their environmental scores and that they consistently value those environmental improvements which are concentrated locally such as reduced soil erosion, while they place less emphasis on those benefits which resemble public goods such as air quality and wildlife habitat.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy; D44; D82; Q51; Q58.
Ano: 2006
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25233

Optimal Incentives under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents: Evidence from Production Contracts Data
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Dubois,   Pierre; Vukina,   Tomislav.
The objective of this paper is to develop an analytical framework for estimation of the parameters of a structural model of an incentive contract under moral hazard, taking into account agents heterogeneity in preferences. We show that allowing the principal to strategically distribute the production inputs across heterogenous agents as part of the contract design, the principal is able to change what appears to be a uniform contract into individualized contracts tailored to fit agents' preferences or characteristics. Using micro level data on swine production contract settlements, we find that contracting farmers are heterogenous with respect to their risk aversion and that this heterogeneity affects the principal's allocation of production inputs across...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Agency Contracts; Optimal Incentives; Moral Hazard; Risk Aversion; Heterogeneity; Production Economics; D82; L24; Q12; K32; L51.
Ano: 2006
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25568

Optimal Share Contracts under Theft
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: de Janvry,   Alain; Sadoulet,   Elisabeth.
Temptation for tenants to under-report output levels under share contracts is undoubtedly high. There is evidence that theft of product occurs and that this affects the design of share contracts. In this case, the optimal output share is chosen to not only induce effort but also to reduce theft of product, while meeting the landlord's limited liability obligation. The tenant's share thus rises with his desire and ability to steal. The optimal contract allows both residual inefficiency in the provision of effort and residual cheating. This contract is also modified by process utility in cheating, ability of the landlord to supervise, risk of revenge with abusive surveillance, and switch to products less prone to theft.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Sharecropping; Cheating; Agrarian contract; Farm Management; Labor and Human Capital; D82; Q15; O17.
Ano: 2004
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25119

Receiving incorrect information is costly: Diffusion and accuracy of market information among farmers in northern Ghana
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Zanello,   Giacomo; Shankar,   Bhavani; Srinivasan,   Chittur S.
The recent adoption of Information Communication Technologies (ICTs, namely mobile phones and radios) in rural areas of Sub- Saharan Africa has brought new evidence that an updated and reliable flow of information can have direct benefits for farmers' welfare. However, if correct market information can benefit the users, incorrect information can be costly. In this study we explore the diffusion (quantity) and the accuracy (quality) of price information among farmers in northern Ghana, with a focus on the role of ICTs.
Tipo: Presentation
Palavras-chave: Market behaviour; Transaction costs; Information technologies; Consumer/Household Economics; International Development; Marketing; Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies; D82; D83; D84; O12; O55.
Ano: 2012
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/123967

Analysis of the Constraints to the Development of a Domestic Improved Seed Potato Industry in Mali
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Diallo,   Marthe.
This paper outlines proposed research, using concepts of New Institutional Economics, to identify the factors constraining the emergence of a market for domestically produced improved seed potatoes in Mali.  It uses the Principal –Agent model to outline how to investigate the feasibility of developing a domestic seed potato industry in Mali by applying the concepts of efficient contract designs and other institutional arrangements. This research will contribute to the literature on: (a) contract and institutional design in the context of asymmetric information and uncertainty typical of agricultural markets in low-income countries and (b) design of improved seed production systems, particularly for clonal crops, in developing countries. The Malian potato...
Tipo: Thesis or Dissertation
Palavras-chave: Principal-agent model; Seed systems; Mali; Agricultural technology development; Input markets; Contracting; Potatoes; Food Security and Poverty; International Development; Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies; D82; L14; Q13; Q16.
Ano: 2008
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50351

Trust and Electronic Commerce in the Agrifood Sector. A Trust Model and Experimental Experiences
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Fritz,   Melanie; Hausen,   Tobias; Schiefer,   Gerhard; Canavari,   Maurizio.
Opportunities coming from electronic commerce provide interesting support options for the Agrifood sector. However, due to the product specific information asymmetry in the agrifood sector, the anonymity of the medium creates a lack of trust increasing transaction costs to engage in e-commerce. This paper develops a trust model for electronic commerce in the agrifood industry allowing for the analysis of trust determinants in traditional agrifood transaction relationships and their transfer to appropriate trust determinants in the e-commerce environment. First experimental results validating the suitability of the model to derive appropriate electronic trust generating elements for a given agrifood transaction environment are presented.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Transaction costs; Asymmetric and private information; Laboratory experiment; Electronic commerce; Trust; Agribusiness; D23; D82; C91.
Ano: 2005
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24742

ASSET STORABILITY AND HEDGING EFFECTIVENESS IN COMMODITY FUTURES MARKETS
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Yang,   Jian; Awokuse,   Titus O.
This paper examines risk minimization hedging effectiveness for major storable and nonstorable agricultural commodity futures markets. Based on the error correction model – bivariate GARCH frameworks, some evidence is found that the hedging effectiveness is stronger for storable commodities than nonstorable commodities under consideration. The finding illustrates an important difference between storable and nonstorable commodities with regard to their hedging function.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Commodity futures; Asset storability; Hedging effectiveness; Multivariate GARCH; Marketing; D82; G19.
Ano: 2002
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/15826

Optimal Incentives Under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents: Evidence from Production Contracts Data
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Dubois,   Pierre; Vukina,   Tomislav.
In this paper we develop an analytical framework for the estimation of the structural model parameters of an incentive contract under moral hazard with heterogeneous agents. Using micro level data on swine production contract settlements, we confirm that contract farmers are heterogenous with respect to their risk aversion and that this heterogeneity affects the principal's allocation of production inputs across farmers. Assuming that contracts are optimal, we obtain estimates of a lower and an upper bound of agents' reservation utilities. We show that farmers with higher risk aversion have lower outside opportunities and hence lower reservation utilities.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Contracting; Heterogenous agents; Moral hazard; Livestock Production/Industries; Production Economics; D82; L24; Q12; K32; L51.
Ano: 2005
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24645

Tractors on eBay and Farmers and Consumers Market Bulletin: An Analysis on the Determinants of Price and Price Differences
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Kostandini,   Genti; Mykerezi,   Elton; Holland,   Liz.
We investigate the determinants of price for tractor auctions on eBay and tractors that are listed in the Farmers and Consumers Market Bulletin (FCMB) in Georgia. Surprisingly, seller reputation is not an important factor while engine hours and the presence of air conditioning appear to influence price on eBay auctions. On average prices for tractors that sold on eBay are not different than those on FCMB. The analysis also suggests that farmers may benefit from the use of online venues.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Internet auctions; Farm machinery; Local listings.; Agribusiness; Industrial Organization; D82; L14.
Ano: 2010
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/56547

Why Don't Lenders Finance High-Return Technological Change in Developing-Country Agriculture?
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Blackman,   Allen.
Most of the literature attributes credit constraints in small-farm developing-country agriculture to the variability of returns to investment in this sector. But the literature does not fully explain lenders. reluctance to finance investments in technologies that provide both higher average and less variable returns. To fill this gap, this article develops an information-theoretic credit market model with endogenous technology choice. The model demonstrates that lenders may refuse to finance any investment in a riskless high-return technology--regardless of the interest rate they are offered--when they are imperfectly informed about loan applicants, time preferences and, therefore, about their propensities to default intentionally in order to finance...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Agriculture; Asymmetric information; Credit; Developing country; Technology adoption; Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies; O12; O16; O33; Q14; D82.
Ano: 2001
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10886

Quality Ambiguity and the Market Mechanism for Credence Goods
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Benner,   Dietrich.
With credence goods consumers cannot judge actual quality neither before purchase (ex ante) nor after purchase (ex post). Trust has to replace own examination and verification. Applying Choquet-Expected Utility theory, ageneral model of credence goods is developed wich takes the problem of trust explicitly in its view and generalizes the problem of quality uncertainty on the 'market for lemmons' of Akerlof (1970) to 'quality ambiguity' with credence goods. The model shows the market mechanism only performing well in providing credence goods when consumers' trust in given information is not too low. With trust too low, sellers of credence good will be driven out of the market by trust induced adverse selection. In market equilibrium prices will always be...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Credence goods; Asymmetric information; Quality ambiguity; Quality uncertainty; Adverse selection; Ambiguity; Choquet expected utility; Agricultural and Food Policy; Marketing; C72; D81; D82.
Ano: 2004
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/98639

Quality Certification by Geographical Indications, Trademarks and Firm Reputation
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Menapace,   Luisa; Moschini,   GianCarlo.
We study firm reputation as a mechanism to assure product quality in perfectly competitive markets in a context in which both certification and trademarks are available. Shapiro’s (1983) model of reputation is extended to reflect both collective and firm-specific reputations, and this framework is used to study certification and trademarks for food products with a regional identity, known as geographical indications (GIs). Our model yields two primary results. First, in markets with asymmetric information and moral hazard problems, credible certification schemes reduce the cost of establishing reputation and lead to welfare gains compared to a situation in which only private trademarks are available. Hence, certification improves the ability of reputation...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Asymmetric Information; Certification; Geographical Indications; Quality; Reputation; Environmental Economics and Policy; D23; D82; L14; L15; Q1.
Ano: 2010
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/61778

Governance Issues in the Principal-Agent Framework: Producing Cellulosic Ethanol in Michigan
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Pandey,   Vivek; Shanoyan,   Aleksan; Ross,   Brent.
This article analyzes the incentives and compensation problems faced by cellulosic ethanol producer and logging firms and the consequent impact on the organization of the wood based cellulosic ethanol industry in the US. The success of this relationship is central to setting up the biofuel industry in Michigan and in the US at large. The theoretical results indicate that specification contract under the principal-agent framework is of limited utility due to’ metering’ problem when the principal contracts with multiple agents for the supply of feedstock.. Alternative arrangements including JVs have the potential to provide close to first best solutions.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Principal-Agent; Cellulosic Ethanol; Michigan; Multiple agents; Asymmetric Information; Agribusiness; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; D82; D86; L23; L24; Q42.
Ano: 2010
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/61362

Past Performance Evaluation in Repeated Procurement: A Simple Model of Handicapping
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Albano,   Gian Luigi; Cesi,   Berardino.
When procurement contracts are awarded through competitive tendering participating firms commit ex ante to fulfil a set of contractual duties. However, selected contractors may find profitable to renege ex post on their promises by opportunistically delivering lower quality standards. In order to deter ex post moral hazard, buyers may use different strategies depending on the extent to which quality dimensions are contractible, that is, verifiable by contracting parties and by courts. We consider a stylized repeated procurement framework in which a buyer awards a contract over time to two firms with different efficiency levels. If the contractor does not deliver the agreed level of performance the buyer may handicap the same firm in future competitive...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Repeated Procurement; Handicapping; Relational Contracts; Stick and Carrot Strategy; Political Economy; C73; D82; D44; H57; K12; L14.
Ano: 2008
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6370

The Role of Information Provision as a Policy Instrument to Supplement Environmental Taxes: Empowering Consumers to Choose Optimally
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Sartzetakis,   Eftichios S.; Xepapadeas,   Anastasios; Petrakis,   Emmanuel.
The present paper examines, within a dynamic framework, the use of information provision as a policy instrument to supplement environmental taxation. We assume that at least a fraction of consumers do not posses the required information to make the optimal choices, and that their behavior at each time period depends on the accumulated stock of information. We show that, as the accumulated stock of information provision increases, both the optimal level of information provided at each period of time and the optimal tax rate decline over time. Our results provide strong evidence in support of information campaigns as a policy instrument to supplement traditional environmental policies. Information provision can shift the demand towards environmentally...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Information Provision; Environmental Taxation; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q53; Q58; D62; D82.
Ano: 2009
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/52342

On the Legitimacy of Coercion for the Financing of Public Goods
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Bierbrauer,   Felix.
The literature on public goods has shown that efficient outcomes are impossible if participation constraints have to be respected. This paper addresses the question whether they should be imposed. It asks under what conditions efficiency considerations justify that individuals are forced to pay for public goods that they do not value. It is shown that participation constraints are desirable if public goods are provided by a malevolent Leviathan. By contrast, with a Pigouvian planner, efficiency can be achieved. Finally, the paper studies the delegation of public goods provision to a profit-maximizing firm. This also makes participation constraints desirable.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Public goods; Mechanism Design; Incomplete Contracts; Regulation; Public Economics; D02; D82; H41; L51.
Ano: 2009
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/55325

Fundamentals Versus Beliefs under Almost Common Knowledge
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Karp,   Larry S.
Modern economic growth models show that the equilibrium outcome may depend on agents' beliefs (expectations) rather than on economic fundamentals (history).  In this situation, the equilibrium is indeterminate.  However, if agents have "almost common knowledge" rather than common knowledge about the economic fundamentals, this indeterminacy vanishes in one of these models, under certain restrictions.  In this situation, the unique competitive equilibrium can be influenced by government policy, just as in standard models.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Equilibrium selection; History versus expectations; Economic growth; Common knowledge; Almost common knowledge; Non-convex technology; International Development; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; D70; D82; D84; J60.
Ano: 2000
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25006

Producer's choice of certification
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Langinier,   Corinne; Babcock,   Bruce A.
Consumers are in general less informed than producers about the quality of agricultural goods. To reduce the information gap, consumers can rely on standards (labels, certifications, geographic indications) that insure quality and origin of the goods. However, these standards do not always fully reveal information. Some of them may just signal that the good is more likely to be of high quality. We investigate what kind of standards are most desirable for producers, and for society in general knowing that any system is costly to implement. One of our findings is that for intermediate values of certification costs, certification that fully reveals information makes high quality producers better off, but make the entire industry worse off. In this case, the...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Asymmetric information; Certification; Clubs; Quality.; Consumer/Household Economics; L11; L15; D82; D71.
Ano: 2005
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19510

ASYMMETRY IN RAW MILK SAFETY PERCEPTIONS AND INFORMATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR RISK IN FRESH PRODUCE MARKETING AND POLICY
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Knutson,   Ronald D.; Currier,   Russell W.; Ribera,   Luis A.; Goeringer,   L. Paul.
Scientific evidence clearly indicates that consumption of raw milk carries substantial disease-inducing health risks. While federal U.S. policy mandates that milk moving in interstate commerce be pasteurized; within 41 of 50 states, raw milk can be obtained for consumption. Warning labels notwithstanding, a segment of U.S. consumers pays higher prices for higher-risk raw milk than for either organic or conventional milk. The behavioral factors leading to raw milk consumption are explored. The paternalistic regulatory options for reducing the risk associated with drinking raw milk are identified. Implications for fresh produce sold directly from farms to consumers or through farmers markets are drawn.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Raw milk; Pasteurization; Health risks; Behavioral economics; Bounded rationality; Paternalistic regulations; Public health; HACCP; GLOBALG.A.P.; Agricultural and Food Policy; Consumer/Household Economics; Demand and Price Analysis; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Food Security and Poverty; Health Economics and Policy; A12; A13; A14; D11; D18; D46; D71; D78; D82; I18; K23; K32; Q11; Q18.
Ano: 2010
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/116440

Model, Model on the Screen, What's the Cost of Going Green?
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Dowlatabadi,   Hadi; Boyd,   David R.; MacDonald,   Jamie.
How much a policy is expected to cost and who bears the brunt of that cost play a significant role in the debates that shape regulations. We do not have a good track record of predicting costs and their ultimate distribution, but systematic reviews of past assessments have identified some of the factors that lead to errors. A wide range of expected costs of climate policy have been hotly debated, but all are likely to be wrong. This does not mean that we should continue a debate using ill-informed analyses. On the contrary, we need early small experiments to shed light on key unknowns. Environmental stewardship is a long-term challenge and an adaptive regulatory approach promises to inform policy targets and improve controls through sequential regulatory...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Cost estimation; Climate policy; Modeling; Adaptive management; Environmental Economics and Policy; D21; D82; D83; F13; O31.
Ano: 2004
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10806

Cross Compliance: what about compliance?
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Stefani,   Gianluca; Giudicissi,   Eufrasia.
We reviewed some moral hazard (MH) models applied to agri-environmental policies and identified the main methodological aspects of the literature on this topics. Imperfect vs incomplete monitoring , static vs dynamic and single vs multiple agents models are the main lines along which the literature has been organised analysing each component of a MH model. Most papers point out the role of farmers' risk aversion in mitigating MH. Others highlight that the observed high rate of compliance is still somewhat paradoxical given current enforcement strategies with low fines and monitoring levels. Cross compliance confirm these findings and urges further studies on dynamic models and farmers' non profit maximising behaviour.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Cross-compliance; Moral Hazard; Enforcement; Agri-environmental schemes; Agricultural and Food Policy; Q15; Q58; D82.
Ano: 2011
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/99597

Consequences of Firms' Relational Financing in the Aftermath of the 1995 Mexican Banking Crisis
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Castañeda,   Gonzalo.
This paper shows that, in the aftermath of the 1995 banking crisis, relational financing was a two-edged sword for firms listed on the Mexican Securities Market. On the negative side, only bank-linked firms observed on average a dependence on cash stock to finance their investment projects. On the positive side, the banking connection was important to boost their profit rates during the 1997-2000 period, at least for financially healthy firms. These econometric results are derived from dynamic panel data models of investment and profit rates, which are estimated by the Generalized Method of Moments, where level and difference equations are combined into a system.
Tipo: Journal Article
Palavras-chave: Relational financing; Banking crisis; Internal capital markets; L25; D82; N26.
Ano: 2005
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/37460

AN AGENDA FOR THE DESIGN AND STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Batabyal,   Amitrajeet A.
The combination of a general greening of international political debate, and the events of 1992 at the Rio Earth summit have led to great interest in the question of global environmental protection. While it is recognized that international environmental agreements (IEAs) are the means by which the earth’s fragile environment is most likely to be protected, this recognition has been recent. Hence, there is very little formal research on the design and study of IEAs. As such, in this paper, I propose and describe a research agenda for the design and study of IEAs. Very generally, I propose that we frame the IEA design question as a problem in mechanism design. We will then be able to use, inter alia, the theory of common agency and the theory of hierarchies...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: International; Environmental; Agreement; Design; Game; Environmental Economics and Policy; International Relations/Trade; D73; D82; L50.
Ano: 1996
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28353

A Theory of Firm Decline
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Gian Luca,   Clementi; Cooley,   Thomas; Di Giannatale,    Sonia.
We study the problem of an investor that buys an equity stake in an entrepreneurial venture, under the assumption that the former cannot monitor the latter’s operations. The dynamics implied by the optimal incentive scheme is rich and quite different from that induced by other models of repeated moral hazard. In particular, our framework generates a rationale for firm decline. As young firms accumulate capital, the claims of both investor (outside equity) and entrepreneur (inside equity) increase. At some juncture, however, even as the latter keeps on growing, invested capital and firm value start declining and so does the value of outside equity. The reason is that incentive provision is costlier the wealthier the entrepreneur (the greater is inside...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Principal Agent; Moral Hazard; Hidden Action; Incentives; Survival; Firm Dynamics; Financial Economics; D82; D86; D92; G32.
Ano: 2010
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/92788

Willingness-to-Pay for Calf Health Programs and Certification Agents
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Schumacher,   Tucker; Schroeder,   Ted C.; Tonsor,   Glynn T.
Cattle feeders want feeder cattle that have been weaned and preconditioned with a certified health program. Preconditioned calves perform more efficiently in the feedlot with lower morbidity and mortality. Health program claims, however, range from no claim to being USDA-certified. The value of health protocol certification may vary with certifying entity. Results from a choice experiment and survey of cattle feeders indicate preconditioning programs that include weaning, vaccinating against respiratory and clostridial/blackleg, and treating for parasites are worth on average $7.28/cwt to feedlots. Furthermore, a health program certified by USDA carries an additional value of $2.37/cwt on average.
Tipo: Article
Palavras-chave: Calf health programs; Calf preconditioning; Value of certification; Marketing; Q13; L15; D82.
Ano: 2012
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/123777

Education, Reputation or Network? Evidence from Italy on Migrant Workers Employability
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Mazzanti,   Massimiliano; Mancinelli,   Susanna; Ponti,   Giovanni; Piva,   Nora.
The strong adverse selection that immigrants face in hosting labour markets may induce them to adopt some behaviours or signals to modify employers’ beliefs. Relevant mechanisms for reaching this purpose are personal reputation; exploiting ethnic networks deeply-rooted in the hosting country; and high educational levels used as an indirect signal of productivity. On this last point, the immigrant status needs a stronger signal compared to that necessary for a local worker, and this may lead the immigrant to accept job qualifications which are lower than those achievable through the embodied educational level. This could explain the over education problem that characterizes many countries, Italy included. The aim of the paper is to investigate whether the...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Educational Qualifications; Migrant Networks; Immigrant Employability; Reputation; Segmented Labour Markets; Labor and Human Capital; D82; J24; I2; F22.
Ano: 2009
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/52344

INCENTIVES AND STANDARDS IN AGENCY CONTRACTS
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Chambers,   Robert G.
This paper studies the structure of state-contingent contracts in the presence of moral hazard and multi-tasking.  Necessary and sufficient conditions for the presence of multi-tasking to lead to fixed payments instead of incentive schemes are identified.  It is shown that the primary determinant of whether multi-tasking leads to higher or lower powered incentives is the role that noncontractible outputs play in helping the agent deal with the production risk associated with the observable and contractible outputs.  When the noncontractible outputs are socially undesirable and risk substitutes, standards are never optimal.  If the noncontractible outputs are socially desirable, standards are never optimal if the noncontractible outputs play a...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Incentives; Multi-tasking; Agency; Risk complementarity; Risk substitutability; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; Risk and Uncertainty; D82; L23; L50.
Ano: 2000
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28605

Crime and Education in a Model of Information Transmission
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Cortes,   Darwin; Friebel,   Guido; Maldonado,   Dario.
We model the decisions of young individuals to stay in school or drop-out and engage in criminal activities. We build on the literature on human capital and crime engagement and use the framework of Banerjee (1993) that assumes that the information needed to engage in crime arrives in the form of a rumor and that individuals update their beliefs about the profitability of crime relative to education. These assumptions allow us to study the effect of social interactions on crime. We first show that a society with fully rational students is less vulnerable to crime than an otherwise identical society with boundedly rational students. We also investigate the spillovers from the actions of talented students to less talented students and show that policies that...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Human Capital; The Economics of Rumors; Social Interactions; Urban Economics; Labor and Human Capital; D82; D83; I28.
Ano: 2010
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/96845

Looking Beyond the Incumbent: The Effects of Exposing Corruption on Electoral Outcomes
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Chong,   Alberto E.; De La O,   Ana; Karlan,   Dean S.; Wantchekon,   Leonard.
Does information about rampant political corruption increase electoral participation and the support for challenger parties? Democratic theory assumes that offering more information to voters will enhance electoral accountability. However, if there is consistent evidence suggesting that voters punish corrupt incumbents, it is unclear whether this translates into increased support for challengers and higher political participation. We provide experimental evidence that information about copious corruption not only decreases incumbent support in local elections in Mexico, but also decreases voter turnout, challengers' votes, and erodes voters' identifcation with the party of the corrupt incumbent. Our results suggest that while flows of information are...
Tipo: Working Paper
Palavras-chave: Corruption; Accountability; Elections; Voting; Information; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Political Economy; Public Economics; D72; D73; D82; D83.
Ano: 2012
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/121640

A Model of Producer Incentives for Livestock Disease Management
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Ranjan,   Ram; Lubowski,   Ruben N.
We examine the management of livestock diseases from the producers' perspective, incorporating information and incentive asymmetries between producers and regulators. Using a dynamic model, we examine responses to different policy options including indemnity payments, subsidies to report at-risk animals, monitoring, and regulatory approaches to decreasing infection risks when perverse incentives and multiple policies interact. This conceptual analysis illustrates the importance of designing efficient combinations of regulatory and incentive-based policies.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Livestock disease; Asymmetric information; Reporting; Indemnities; Risk management; Livestock Production/Industries; C61; D82; Q12; Q18; Q28.
Ano: 2004
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/15653

On the Theory and Practice of Water Regulation
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Tsur,   Yacov.
We study water regulation for a schematic water economy representing a wide range of real world situations. A water policy has inter- and intra-temporal components. The first determines the limits on extractions from the naturally replenished sources, given the stochastic nature of recharge processes associated with uncertain precipitation. The intra-temporal regulation is concerned mainly with the allocating of the extracted and produced water among the end-users. The prices that implement the optimal intra-temporal allocation are derived. Regulation issues associated with cost recovery and asymmetric information are discussed.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Scarcity; Pricing; Optimal allocation; Water economy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; C61; D82; Q11; Q25.
Ano: 2009
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/47503

The Market for Used Cars: A New Test of the Lemons Model
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Emons,   Winand; Sheldon,   George.
The lemons model assumes that owners of used cars have an informational advantage over potential buyers with respect to the quality of their vehicles. Owners of bad cars will try to sell them to unsuspecting buyers while owners of good cars will hold on to theirs. Consequently, the quality of traded automobiles should be sub-average. In contrast to previous work, the following paper tests both the assumption of informational asymmetry and the prediction of sub-average traded car quality using a sample consisting of all 1985 cars registered in the Swiss canton of Basle-City over the period 1985-1991. Our data support both the assumption and the prediction of the lemons model. The lemons problem does not appear to be widespread, however. Das "Lemons"-Modell...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Adverse Selection; Used Car Market; Duration Models; Marketing; C41; D82; L15; L62.
Ano: 2002
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26353

Contracting with Smallholders under Joint Liability
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Kaminski,   Jonathan.
Replaced with revised version of paper Jan. 11, 2012
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Contract farming; Moral hazard; Joint liability; Peer monitoring; Agricultural Finance; Consumer/Household Economics; Farm Management; Financial Economics; Public Economics; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; D82; L14; 013; Q13.
Ano: 2009
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/93128

A Principal-Agent Model for Investigating Traceability Systems Incentives on Food Safety
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Resende Filho,   Moises de Andrade.
This article investigates the effects of contingent payments and a traceability system's expected traceback rate of success on the food safety effort exerted by raw material suppliers. This sheds light on when contingent payments and the reliability of a traceability system are substitutes and complements to each other in terms of inducing raw material suppliers to exert higher food safety effort. In addition, the effect of higher penalties and costs of food safety crisis on the effort to be induced by buyers (principal) on suppliers (agents) is investigated under a symmetric information setting. Finally, the asymmetric information setting is formalized as a principal-agent model and left to be explored in a future work. Some numerical exercises are...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Information Asymmetry; Identity Preservation; Food Traceability; Supply Chain Management.; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; D82; D86; C61.
Ano: 2007
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7897

The Relevance of Information Sources on Adoption of                                                        Precision Farming Technologies by Cotton Producers
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Garcia-Jimenez,   Carlos I.; Mishra,   Ashok K.; Paxton,   Kenneth W.; Lambert,   Dayton M.; Velandia,   Margarita M.; Rejesus,   Roderick M.; Segarra,   Eduardo.
Replaced with revised version of paper 02/16/11.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Strategic communication; Competitiveness; Extension; Economics of information; Technology diffusion; Technology supply; Communication methods; Knowledge management; Production Economics; Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies; Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession; D22; D80; D82; D83; Q12; Q16.
Ano: 2010
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/98123

Mixed Tournaments, Common Shocks, and Disincentives: An Experimental Study
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Wu,   Steven Y.; Roe,   Brian E.; Sporleder,   Thomas L.
Two well-known hypotheses from the literature on tournaments are that (1) tournaments can filter out common shocks thereby reducing agents’ risk exposure; and (2) disincentive effects can arise when a tournament scheme is administered on a group of mixed ability agents.  While handicapping and/or the creation of homogeneous groups have been suggested as mechanisms for mitigating disincentive effects, it is often impractical to use handicapping schemes and nearly impossible to create a completely homogeneous labor force.  Hence, contract administrators who intend to use tournaments to elicit effort must be able to assess the positive effects of tournaments (eliminate common shocks) against the negative effects (disincentive effects).  Using economic...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Mixed tournaments; Incentives; Relative performance contracts; Experimental economics; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C91 D01; D81; D82; D86.
Ano: 2007
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/9703

Does tendering conservation contracts with performance payments generate additional benefits?
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Schilizzi,   Steven; Breustedt,   Gunnar; Latacz-Lohmann,   Uwe.
Policy makers aiming to get private landholders to supply non-marketed environmental services may need to provide efficient economic incentives. Two ideas have been explored to achieve this: linking contract payments to environmental outcomes and submitting the contracts to competitive tender. This paper investigates whether there are any gains to be had by combining the potential benefits of both approaches. Landholders’ risk aversion to only partially controlled outcomes may offset incentive effects if the fall in participation outweighs any increases in individual effort. Controlled lab experiments were designed on the basis of a theoretical model and were run in two countries, with varying rates of payments linked to environmental outcomes. Results...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Conservation tenders; Auctions; Incentive contracts; Agricultural policy; Environmental policy; Market-based instruments; Experimental economics; Environmental Economics and Policy; Land Economics/Use; C92; D44; D82; D86; H57; Q24; Q28.
Ano: 2011
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/100883

Efficiency of Selected Risk Management Instruments - An Empirical Analysis of Risk Reduction in Kazakhstani Crop Production
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Heidelbach,   Olaf.
Recent academic discussion regarding crop insurance in developing and transition countries has focused on weather index insurance. But empirical analyses of such schemes based on farm level data cannot be found in the literature, though this insurance type shows clear advantages compared to multiple-peril crop insurance and revenue insurance. Recent empirical applications of risk and stochastic programming models focus on the optimisation of production planning, while literature on the effects of crop insurance on the farm level mainly focuses on the empirical investigation of reductions in farm income variance. The novelty of this paper is that it integrates regionally-adapted insurance products and expert-evaluated technology choices into a programming...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Risk; Risk management; Insurance; Agriculture; Kazakhstan; Crop Production/Industries; Risk and Uncertainty; Q12; Q14; G22; D82.
Ano: 2006
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25243

Group versus Individual Liability: Long Term Evidence from Philippine Microcredit Lending Groups
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Gine,   Xavier; Karlan,   Dean S.
Group liability in microcredit purports to improve repayment rates through peer screening, monitoring, and enforcement. However, it may create excessive pressure, and discourage reliable clients from borrowing. Two randomized trials tested the overall effect, as well as specific mechanisms. The first removed group liability from pre-existing groups and the second randomly assigned villages to either group or individual liability loans. In both, groups still held weekly meetings. We find no increase in default and larger groups after three years in pre-existing areas, and no change in default but fewer groups created after two years in the expansion areas.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Microfinance; Group lending; Group liability; Joint liability; Social capital; Microenterprises; Informal economies; Access to finance; Consumer/Household Economics; Financial Economics; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; International Development; C93; D71; D82; D91; G21; O12; O16; O17.
Ano: 2009
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50951

Utilizing cow-calf producer information to increase profits in retained ownership of beef cattle
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Williams,   Brian R.; Stockton,   Matthew C.
Retained ownership has been found to be a profitable endeavor, yet many cow-calf producers choose not to retain their calves. While this paper does not directly explore the reasons producers might have for not retaining ownership, which may include uncertainty, it does explore innovative use of asymmetrical information that might reduce some of the uncertainty. Results are summarized in a regression analysis similar to a Hedonic price model where birth weight, weaning weight, and weaning age are found to be important factors to consider when selecting animals to retain.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Asymmetrical Information; Hedonic Price Model; Beef; Retained Ownership; Producer Profitability; Farm Management; Livestock Production/Industries; Production Economics; D82; M31; Q13.
Ano: 2011
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/98773

You Can Pick Your Friends, But You Need to Watch Them: Loan Screening and Enforcement in a Referrals Field Experiment
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Bryan,   Gharad; Karlan,   Dean S.; Zinman,   Jonathan.
We examine a randomized trial that allows separate identification of peer screening and enforcement of credit contracts. A South African microlender offered half its clients a bonus for referring a friend who repaid a loan. For the remaining clients, the bonus was conditional on loan approval. After approval, the repayment incentive was removed from half the referrers in the first group and added for half those in the second. We find large enforcement effects, a $12 (100 Rand) incentive reduced default by 10 percentage points from a base of 20%. In contrast, we find no evidence of screening.
Tipo: Working Paper
Palavras-chave: Information asymmetries; Credit market failures; Peer networks; Social capital; Social networks; Consumer/Household Economics; Financial Economics; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; International Development; C93; D12; D14; D82; O12; O16.
Ano: 2012
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/121674

On the Theory and Practice of Water Regulation
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Tsur,   Yacov.
We study water regulation for a schematic water economy representing a wide range of real world situations. A water policy has inter- and intra-temporal components. The first determines the limits on extractions from the naturally replenished sources, given the stochastic nature of recharge processes associated with uncertain precipitation. The intra-temporal regulation is concerned mainly with the allocating of the extracted and produced water among the end-users. The prices that implement the optimal intra-temporal allocation are derived. Regulation issues associated with cost recovery and asymmetric information are discussed.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Scarcity; Pricing; Optimal allocation; Water economy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; C61; D82; Q11; Q25.
Ano: 2009
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/47173

Nonpoint Source Pollution Taxes and Excessive Tax Burden
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Karp,   Larry S.
If a regulator is unable to measure firms' individual emissions, an ambient tax can be used to achieve the socially desired level of pollution. With this tax, each firm pays a unit tax on aggregate emissions. In order for the tax to be effective, firms must recognize that their decisions affect aggregate emissions. When firms behave strategically with respect to the tax-setting regulator, under plausible circumstances their tax burden is lower under an ambient tax, relative to the tax which charges firms on the basis of individual emissions. Firms may prefer the case where the regulator is unable to observe individual firm emissions, even if this asymmetric information causes the regulator to tax each firm on the basis of aggregate emissions.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Ambient tax; Nonpoint source pollution; Moral hazard; Asymmetric information; Differential games; Environmental Economics and Policy; D82; H20; H40; Q20.
Ano: 1998
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25100

Theory of Contracts and Agri-Environment Policies: A Budget Restriction Alters Standard Results of Mechanisms Design Theory
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Christensen,   Jan.
Agri-environmental schemes are offered by a regulator to farmers. The farmer is to produce certain environmental goods and gets a pecuniary compensation for doing so. The problem of designing optimal schemes is dealt with using mechanisms design theory. This paper considers the situation where the regulator faces a budget constraint on total payments to farmers. It is shown, that 2 results of standard mechanisms design theory are affected when a budget restriction on total payments is present. 1) The "no distortion at the top rule" does not always hold. 2) It is not always optimal to offer heterogeneous farmers heterogeneous argi-environmental schemes.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Agri-environmental schemes; Mechanisms design; Information Economics; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q28; D82.
Ano: 2002
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24882

Dynamic regulation of nonpoint source pollution when the number of emitters is large
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Tsur,   Yacov; de Gorter,   Harry.
When a nonpoint source pollution process involves many polluters, each taking his own contribution to aggregate pollution to be negligible, ambient-based policies become ineffective due to lack of strategic interactions between dischargers. We offer a regulation mechanism for this case. The mechanism consists of inter-period and intra-period components. The first exploits ambient (aggregate) information to derive the optimal pollution and aggregate emission processes and the ensuing social price of emission. The intra-period mechanism takes as given the social price of emission and implements the optimal output-abatement-emission allocation across the heterogenous, privately informed firms in each time period. The mechanism gives rise to the full...
Tipo: Article
Palavras-chave: Nonpoint source pollution; Abatement; Stock externality; Dynamic regulation; Markov decision process; Asymmetric information; Crop Production/Industries; C61; D82; H23; L51; Q58.
Ano: 2012
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/122124

Modelling functional food choice and health care impacts: A literature review
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Zou,   Ning Ning (Helen); Hobbs,   Jill E.
The global market for functional foods is estimated to be worth about US$33 billion (Hilliam, 2000). Given the information asymmetry inherent in functional foods, labelling information plays a key role in allowing consumers to make informed choices. Understanding consumer choices with respect to functional foods is an important new area of research. Several potential consumer choice models are available to assess consumer choices for functional food. This paper provides an overview of key consumer research questions, and a review of several different models, including the Stated Preference Choice Model with Discrete Choice Analysis, Dependent Preference Model, and modified Protection Motivation Theory.
Tipo: Report
Palavras-chave: Information asymmetry; Stated preference models; Protection motivation; Functional food; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Q13; I1; D12; D82.
Ano: 2006
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/91556

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: THE EFFECT OF BUDGET BALANCE                 AND POLLUTION CEILING CONSTRAINTS
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Batabyal,   Amitrajeet A.
I analyze the problem faced by an asymmetrically informed supranational governmental authority (SNGA) with limited financial resources who wishes to design an International Environmental Agreement (IEA). The SNGA cannot contract directly with polluting firms in the various LDCs, but he must deal with such firms through their governments. I study this tripartite hierarchical interaction and focus on the properties of the optimal ex post contracts (IEAs), which can be implemented by the SNGA, in turn, in the case where governments and firms in each nation do not collude and then in the case where governments and firms do collude. I find that the monetary transfers necessary to induce optimal behavior by governments and firms are not very sensitive to the...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Environmental; Agreement; LDCs; Budget; Ceiling; Environmental Economics and Policy; International Development; D62; D82; Q25.
Ano: 1996
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28347

The Public Management of Risk: Separating Ex Ante and Ex Post Monitors
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Hiriart,   Yolande; Martimort,   David; Pouyet,   Jerome.
When a firm undertakes risky activities, the conflict between social and private incentives to implement safety care requires public intervention which can take the form of both monetary incentives but also ex ante or ex post monitoring, i.e., before or after an accident occurs. We delineate the optimal scope of monitoring depending on whether public monitors are benevolent or corruptible. We show that separating the ex ante and the ex post monitors increases the likelihood of ex post investigation, helps prevent capture and improves welfare.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Risk Regulation; Monitoring; Capture; Integration; Separation; Financial Economics; L51; D82.
Ano: 2010
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/98454

Adverse Selection in the Environmental Stewardship Scheme: Does the Higher Level Entry Scheme Design Reduce Adverse Selection?
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Quillerou,   Emmanuelle; Fraser,   Rob W.
The Environmental Stewardship Scheme provides payments to farmers for the provision of environmental services based on agricultural foregone income. This creates a potential incentive compatibility problem which, combined with an information asymmetry on farm land heterogeneity, could lead to adverse selection of farmers into the scheme. However, the Higher Level Scheme (HLS) design includes some features that potentially reduce adverse selection. This paper studies the adverse selection problem of the HLS using a principal agent framework at the regional level. It is found that, at the regional level, the enrolment of more land from lower payment regions for a given budget constraint has led to a greater overall contracted area (and thus potential...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Adverse selection; Agri-environment; Environmental Stewardship; Principal-agent; Contract; Environmental Economics and Policy; D78; D82; H44; Q18; Q58.
Ano: 2009
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51068

Ties that Bind: The Kin System as a Mechanism of Income-Hiding between Spouses in Rural Ghana
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Castilla,   Carolina.
I present a simple model of intra-household allocation between spouses to show that when the quantity of resources available to the household is not perfectly observed by both spouses, hiding of income can occur even when revelation of the additional resources increases bargaining power. From the model, a test to identify income hiding empirically is derived. For the empirical application, a household survey conducted in Southern Ghana is used. I exploit the variation in the degree of asymmetric information between spouses, measured as the difference between the husband’s own reporting of farm sales and the wife’s reporting of his farm sales, to test whether the allocation of resources is consistent with hiding. For identification, the wife’s clan and the...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Incomplete information; Income hiding; Non-cooperative family bargaining; Consumer/Household Economics; International Development; D13; D82; J12.
Ano: 2011
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/104072

Group versus Individual Liability: Long Term Evidence from Philippine Microcredit Lending Groups
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Gine,   Xavier; Karlan,   Dean.
Group liability in microcredit purports to improve repayment rates through peer screening, monitoring, and enforcement.  However, it may create excessive pressure, and discourage reliable clients from borrowing. Two randomized trials tested the overall effect, as well as specific mechanisms.  The first removed group liability from pre-existing groups and the second randomly assigned villages to either group or individual liability loans. In both, groups still held weekly meetings. We find no increase in default and larger groups after three years in pre-existing areas, and no change in default but fewer groups created after two years in the expansion areas.
Tipo: Working Paper
Palavras-chave: Microfinance; Group lending; Group liability; Joint liability; Social capital; Micro-enterprises; Informal economies; Access to finance; Consumer/Household Economics; Financial Economics; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; International Development; C93; D71; D82; D91; G21; O12; O16; O17.
Ano: 2009
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/229136

Rational Exaggeration in Information Aggregation Games
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Rausser,   Gordon C.; Simon,   Leo K.; Zhao,   Jinhua.
This paper studies a class of information aggregation models which we call “aggregation games.” It departs from the related literature in two main respects: information is aggregated by averaging rather than majority rule, and each player selects from a continuum of reports rather than making a binary choice. Each member of a group receives a private signal, then submits a report to the center, who makes a decision based on the average of these reports. The essence of an aggregation game is that heterogeneous players engage in a “tug-of-war,” as they attempt to manipulate the center’s decision process by mis-reporting their private information. When players have distinct biases, almost of them rationally exaggerate the extent of these biases. The degree of...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Information aggregation; Majority rule; Proportional representation; Mean versus median mechanism; Strategic communication; Incomplete information games; Strategic information transmission; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; F71; D72; D82.
Ano: 2008
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43976

Loss Aversion and Reference Points in Contracts
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Just,   David R.; Wu,   Steven Y.
Loss aversion has become the dominant alternative to expected utility theory for modeling choice under uncertainty. The setting of the base payment in contracts provides an interesting application of referenced based decision theory. The impact of loss aversion on contract structure depends critically on whether reservation opportunities (outside options) are evaluated with respect to the reference point implied in the contract.  We show that when reservation opportunities are independent of the reference point, reward contracts are optimal.  However, when reservation opportunities are evaluated against the reference point, then penalty contracts are more efficient.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Risk and Uncertainty; L14; D81; D21; D82.
Ano: 2005
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28727

In Search of Stars: Network Formation among Heterogeneous Agents
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Ule,   Aljaz; Goeree,   Jacob K.; Riedl,   Arno.
This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment on network formation among heterogeneous agents. The experimental design extends the Bala-Goyal (2000) model of network formation with decay and two-way flow of benefits by allowing for agents with lower linking costs or higher benefits to others. Furthermore, agents' types may be common knowledge or private information. In all treatments, the (efficient) equilibrium network has a "star" structure. With homogeneous agents, equilibrium predictions fail completely. In contrast, with heterogeneous agents stars frequently occur, often with the high-value or low-cost agent in the center. Stars are not born but rather develop: with a high-value agent, the network's centrality, stability, and efficiency all...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Network Formation; Experiment; Heterogeneity; Private Information; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C72; C92; D82; D85.
Ano: 2007
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/9099

Crop insurance market development in a transition economy: The case of Kazakhstan
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Heidelbach,   Olaf; Bokusheva,   Raushan.
We analyze the current state and future requirements of an agricultural income stabilization mechanism in a transition country – namely, the crop insurance system in Kazakhstan. Three objectives will be pursued: First, factors influencing the development of the crop insurance market will be identified. Second, insurance’s capabilities to efficiently stabilize income under transition circumstances will be evaluated. Finally, recommendations for developing crop insurance as an effective income stabilization tool will be provided. Results indicate that the prevailing institutional framework for establishing a sustainable crop insurance system is rather weak, and available insurance products are not preventing the problem of asymmetric information to a...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Risk-management; Crop insurance; Institutions; Mathematical programming; Kazakhstan; Agricultural Finance; Risk and Uncertainty; D81; D82; G22; Q14.
Ano: 2009
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51614

Role of Panel Analysis in Identifying Asymmetric Information with Optional Unit Provision in Federal Crop Insurance
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Shaik,   Saleem.
This paper has a two-fold contribution, first we demonstrate the relationship of spatial, temporal and residual yield risk estimated from a two-way panel random effects model to asymmetric information with an optional unit provision in the federal crop insurance program. Second, the yield risk components are incorporated in a discrete choice model to examine the presence of asymmetric information due to potential yield switching with optional unit provisions. Empirical application to 1998 U.S. cotton crop insurance data reveals the presence of asymmetric information with optional unit provisions.
Tipo: Report
Palavras-chave: Adverse Selection; Moral Hazard; Optional Unit Policy; Crop Insurance; U.S. Cotton; Crop Production/Industries; Demand and Price Analysis; D82; G22; Q10.
Ano: 2009
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/54983

Intra-Household Resource Management Structure and Income-Hiding under Incomplete Information
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Castilla,   Carolina.
There is evidence that some multi-person households may withhold income transfers, such as bonuses, gifts, and cash transfers, from other members of the household (Ashraf (2009); Vogler and Pahl, (1994)). In this paper, I show that the incentives to hide income under incomplete information regarding the quantity of resources available to the household differ for three different household resource management structures. I illustrate this with a simple two-stage game. In the first stage, one spouse receives a monetary transfer that is unobserved by her spouse, and she must decide whether to reveal or to hide it. In the second stage, spouses bargain over the allocation of resources between a household good and private expenditure. The three models differ in...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Incomplete information; Household bargaining; Resource management systems; Demand and Price Analysis; Labor and Human Capital; D13; D82; J12.
Ano: 2010
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/61607

Grain price adjustment asymmetry: the case of cowpea in Ghana
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Langyintuo,   Augustine S.
Patterns in price adjustment in response to information are important to market practitioners. This study looks at cowpea real wholesale price adjustment patterns in Bolgatanga, Wa, Makola and Techiman markets in Ghana. Using Techiman as the central market, a threshold autoregressive test for asymmetric price adjustment rejected the null hypothesis of symmetric adjustment for only the Bolgatanga-Techiman price series. An autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic regression indicates that wholesalers in Bolgatanga market respond differentially to price signals from Techiman than those in the other two markets. This suggests that policies targeting cowpea traders must recognize the differential responses by wholesalers to information.
Tipo: Journal Article
Palavras-chave: Africa; Ghana; Wholesalers; Market information; Autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity; Threshold autoregressive; Crop Production/Industries; D82; D43.
Ano: 2010
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/96165

When Promoters Like Scalpers
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Karp,   Larry S.; Perloff,   Jeffrey M.
If a monopoly supplies a perishable good, such as tickets to a performance, and is unable to price discriminate within a period, the monopoly may benefit from the potential entry of resellers. If the monopoly attempts to intertemporally price discriminate, the equilibrium in the game among buyers is indeterminate when the resellers are not allowed to enter, and the monopoly's problem is not well defined. An arbitrarily small amount of heterogeneity of information among the buyers leads to a unique equilibrium. We show how the potential entry of resellers alters this equilibrium.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Intertemporal price discrimination; Scalpers; Coordination game; Common knowledge; Demand and Price Analysis; Industrial Organization; L12; D42; D45; D82.
Ano: 2003
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25087

Lack of Credibility in Food Markets - Driving Medium Quality Food Out of the Market
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Christensen,   Jan; Graversen,   Jesper T.
Some food markets are dominated by high quality and standard quality segments, whereas medium quality products are almost absent. A modeling framework with asymmetric information regarding true quality of the products and the resulting lack of consumer confidence is presented. Uncertainty regarding the quality of alleged medium quality products provides certain consumer groups to divert consumptions away from medium quality to either standard or high quality products. These countervailing incentives explain the missing medium quality products. Empirical examples are given to motivate the model.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Adverse selection; Asymmetric information; Consumer behavior; Product differentiation; Uncertainty; Consumer/Household Economics; D11; D82; Q13.
Ano: 2005
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24539

Consumers’ Willingness to Pay for New Genetically Modified Food Products: Evidence from Experimental Auctions of Intragenic and Transgenic Foods
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Colson,   Gregory; Huffman,   Wallace E.
Early GM traits were obtained by transferring genes across species, largely from soil bacteria. Part of the consumer resistance to them has been their transgenic nature. Recently, breakthroughs have occurred using intragenic bioengineering where genes are moved long distances within a specie, for example in potato, and without antibiotic markers. The objective of this research is to assess consumers’ acceptance and willingness to pay (WTP) for new intragenic fresh potato, tomato, and broccoli with higher levels of antioxidants and vitamin C, which are consumer traits. To elicit consumer valuations, a new series of experimental auctions were conducted in 2007 that built upon methodology developed in our earlier research. WTP was assessed in a multi-round...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: GM foods; Consumer attributes; Willingness to pay; Economics experiments; Consumer/Household Economics; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Q10; D11; D82; D44.
Ano: 2009
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/49986

Creating Incentives for Micro-Credit Agents to Lend to the Poor
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Aubert,   Cecile; de Janvry,   Alain; Sadoulet,   Elisabeth.
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) have introduced incentive pay schemes for their credit agents to induce information acquisition on borrowers. Bonuses linked to repayment are efficient for profit-oriented MFIs but insufficient for nonprofit MFIs trying to reach very poor borrowers, when repayment and wealth are positively correlated. We show that no incentive scheme is consistent with this (non-verifiable) objective: Random audits on the share of very poor borrowers selected by the agent become necessary. Under the optimal contract, non-profit MFIs generally maximize the number of poor borrowers it services by crosssubsidization between very poor and less poor borrowers.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Micro-credit; Pro-poor; Objectives; Incentives; Financial Economics; Food Security and Poverty; O16; D82; L31.
Ano: 2004
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25024

Adverse Selection in the Environmental Stewardship Scheme: Evidence in the Higher Level Stewardship Scheme?
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Quillerou,   Emmanuelle; Fraser,   Rob W.; Fraser,   Iain.
The Environmental Stewardship Scheme provides payments to farmers for the provision of environmental services based on foregone agricultural income. This creates a potential incentive compatibility problem which, combined with an information asymmetry on farm land heterogeneity, could lead to adverse selection of farmers into the Scheme and therefore reduced cost-effectiveness of the Scheme. This reduced cost-effectiveness would be represented by a systematic overpayment of farmers for the land enrolled into the Scheme, compared to the opportunity cost of production. This paper examines the potential adverse selection problem affecting the higher tier of the Environmental Stewardship, the Higher Level Stewardship, using a principal agent framework combined...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Adverse selection; Agri-environment; Environmental Stewardship; Principal-agent; Contract; Environmental Economics and Policy; D78; D82; H44; Q18; Q58.
Ano: 2010
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/91676

On the Accuracy of Regulatory Cost Estimates
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Harrington,   Winston; Morgenstern,   Richard D.; Nelson,   Peter.
This study compares ex ante estimates of the direct costs of individual regulations to ex post assessments of the same regulations. Our review of more than two dozen environmental and occupational safety regulations indicates that ex ante estimates of total (direct) costs have tended to exceed actuals. We find this to be true of 12 of the 25 rules in our data set, while for only 6 were the ex ante estimates too low. The overestimation of total costs is often due to errors in the quantity of emission reductions achieved by the rule which, in turn, suggest that the rule's benefits may also be overestimated. The quantity errors are driven by both baseline and compliance issues. At least for EPA and OSHA rules, overestimation of per-unit abatement costs occurs...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Environmental costs; Costing accuracy; Innovation and regulation; Demand and Price Analysis; D82; K23; Q28.
Ano: 1999
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10894

Current factors of insurance in agriculture
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Bokusheva,   Raushan; Heidelbach,   Olaf.
This discussion paper is our response to numerous questions and the desire of our counterparts from the CIS countries to receive more up-to-date information about insurance in agriculture. Accordingly, we have tried to shed light on the main aspects of insurance as one tool of risk management in agriculture. Thus, our purpose is to give the reader information on principles and potential of insurance, its main problems and possible solutions. Additionally, this paper provides a comparative overview of the presently most widespread insurance schemes.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Risiko; Versicherung; Versicherungsprodukte; Landwirtschaft; Risk; Insurance; Insurance schemes; Agriculture; Слова: риск; Страхование; Страховые схемы; Сельское хозяйство.; Agribusiness; Farm Management; Industrial Organization; International Development; Risk and Uncertainty; G22; Q14; D82.
Ano: 2004
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/92167