Consulta: subjectFacets:"Emissions trade"
Registros recuperados: 4
Data/hora: 01/06/2024 17:43:24

Suggestions for the Road to Copenhagen
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Karp,   Larry S.; Zhao,   Jinhua.
We provide a unified discussion of the issues that confront negotiators of the next international climate agreement. We offer a novel proposal that entitles countries to discharge their treaty obligations by paying a “fine”. This escape clause provides cost insurance, simplifies the problem of enforcing compliance, and increases incentives to participate in the agreement. We explain why developed country obligations should rely on a cap and trade commitment rather than carbon taxes. A Central Bank maintains stability of carbon prices by defending a price ceiling and floor. An so-called intensity target is not a good alternative to an emissions cap. Modest trade restrictions, consistent with WTO law, will form an important part of the next agreement....
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Kyoto protocol; Escape clause; Emissions trade; Taxes versus cap and trade; Price stability; Carbon leakage; Trade restrictions; Differentiated responsibility; Clean development mechanism; Sectoral agreements; Demand and Price Analysis; Environmental Economics and Policy; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; Q54; Q58; F13.
Ano: 2009
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51610

International Environmental Agreements: Emissions trade, safety valves and escape clauses
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Karp,   Larry S.; Zhao,   Jinhua.
We explain how the structure of multi-national or multi-regional environmental agreements affect their chance of success. Trade in emissions permits has ambiguous and in some cases surprising effects on both the equilibrium level of abatement, and on the ability to persuade nations or regions to participate in environmental agreements. An escape clause policy and a safety valve policy have essentially the same properties when membership in environmental agreement is pre-determined, but they create markedly different effects on the incentives to join such an agreement. The two policies lead to a qualitative difference in the leverage that a potential member of the agreement exercises on other members.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Kyoto Protocol; Escape clause; Emissions trade; Cost uncertainty; Participation game; International Environmental Agreement; Environmental Economics and Policy; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; Risk and Uncertainty; C72; H4; Q54.
Ano: 2009
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51611

A Proposal for the Design of the Successor to the Kyoto Protocol
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Karp,   Larry S.; Zhao,   Jinhua.
The successor to the Kyoto Protocol should impose national ceilings on rich countries’ greenhouse gas emissions and promote voluntary abatement by developing countries. Our proposal gives signatories the option of exercising an escape clause that relaxes their requirement to abate. This feature helps to solve the participation and compliance problems that have weakened the Protocol. We support the use of carefully circumscribed trade restrictions in order to reduce the real or perceived problem of carbon leakage.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Kyoto protocol; Escape clause; Emissions trade; Clean development mechanism; Environmental Economics and Policy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; Q54; Q58; F13.
Ano: 2008
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/42878

Assessing the European Union emissions trading directive
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Convery,   Frank J.; Redmond,   Luke; Dunne,   Louise; Ryan,   Lisa B.
The Emissions Trading scheme now (January 2003) in prospect in the European Union is likely to be the first trans-national greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme in the world.  With the participation of the European Economic Area [EEA] countries and with the forthcoming EU enlargement,  30 countries could be involved in this scheme by 2012. Under European Union law, the European Commission is responsible for making proposals, which are then decided upon by the Council of Ministers  - on a 'qualified majority' basis in this case -  representing the 15 Member State governments, and the European Parliament. In the case of this Directive, the Commission prepared its initial proposals, which have then been scrutinised by the European Parliament and the Council...
Tipo: Journal Article
Palavras-chave: Emissions trade; Directive; Europe; International Relations/Trade; F18; N54; Q56.
Ano: 2003
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28794