Consulta: subjectFacets:"G34"
Registros recuperados: 6
Data/hora: 06/06/2024 01:12:26

European Takeover Law: The Case for a Neutral Approach
Provedor de dados: Research in Agricultural & Applied Economics (AgEcon Searh)
Autores: Enriques,   Luca.
This paper argues that in revising the Takeover Bid Directive, EU policymakers should adopt a neutral approach toward takeovers, i.e. enact rules that neither hamper nor promote them. The rationale behind this approach is that takeovers can be both value-creating and value-decreasing and there is no way to tell ex ante whether they are of the former or the latter kind. Unfortunately, takeover rules cannot be crafted so as to hinder all the bad takeovers while at the same time promoting the good ones. Further, contestability of control is not cost-free, because it has a negative impact on managers’ and block-holders’ incentives to make firm-specific investments of human capital, which in turn affects firm value. It is thus argued that individual companies...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Takeover Bid Directive; Board Neutrality; Mandatory Bid Rule; Market for Corporate Control; Financial Economics; K22; G34; G38.
Ano: 2010
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/60748

What is Different about Government-Controlled Acquirers in Cross-Border Acquisitions?
Provedor de dados: Research in Agricultural & Applied Economics (AgEcon Searh)
Autores: Karolyi,   G. Andrew; Liao,   Rose C.
We examine the motives for and consequences of 5,317 failed and completed cross-border acquisitions constituting $619 billion of total activity that were led by government-controlled acquirers over the period from 1990 to 2008. We benchmark this activity at the aggregate country level and also at the deal level with cross-border acquisitions involving corporate acquirers over the same period. We find that government-led deal activity is relatively more intense for geographically-closer countries, but also relatively less sensitive to differences in the level of economic development of the acquirer’s and target’s home countries, in the quality of their legal institutions and accounting standards, and to how stringent are restrictions on FDI flows in their...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Government-controlled Acquirers; Cross-Border Acquisitions; Financial Economics; G15; G34.
Ano: 2010
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/60686

On the Real Effects of Bank Bailouts: Micro-Evidence from Japan
Provedor de dados: Research in Agricultural & Applied Economics (AgEcon Searh)
Autores: Giannetti,   Mariassunta; Simonov,   Andrei.
Exploiting the Japanese banking crisis as a laboratory, we provide firm-level evidence on the real effects of bank bailouts. Government recapitalizations result in positive abnormal returns for the clients of recapitalized banks. After recapitalizations, banks extend larger loans to their clients and some firms increase investment, but do not create more jobs than comparable firms. Most importantly, recapitalizations allow banks to extend larger loans to low and high quality firms alike, and low quality firms experience higher abnormal returns than other firms. Interestingly, recapitalizations by private investors have similar effects. Moreover, bank mergers engineered to enhance bank stability appear to hurt the borrowers of the sounder banks involved in...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Recapitalization; Merger; Banking Crisis; Financial Economics; G21; G34.
Ano: 2009
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/55330

Agency Theory Issues in the Food Processing Industry
Provedor de dados: Research in Agricultural & Applied Economics (AgEcon Searh)
Autores: Boland,   Michael A.; Golden,   Bill B.; Tsoodle,   Leah J.
The objective is to identify significant determinants of performance for food processing firms over the 1992 to 2003 time period, focusing particularly on the issue of family control. Variables measuring firm effects such as asset size, governance, income distribution, and risk are used to explain return on equity. This study builds upon previous research by including a measure of income distribution in the food processing industry. Governance variables are found to be significant determinants of return on equity. The results found no evidence of agency problems in family-controlled firms during this time period.
Tipo: Journal Article
Palavras-chave: Agribusiness; Institutional economics; Organizational economics; Agribusiness; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Production Economics; D23; G34; Q13; Q14.
Ano: 2008
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/47203

Executive Compensation: Facts
Provedor de dados: Research in Agricultural & Applied Economics (AgEcon Searh)
Autores: Clementi,   Gian Luca; Cooley,   Thomas.
In this paper we describe the important features of executive compensation in the US from 1993 to 2006. Some confirm what has been found for earlier periods and some are novel. Notable facts are that: the compensation distribution is highly skewed; each year, a sizeable fraction of chief executives lose money; the use of security grants has increased over time; the income accruing to CEOs from the sale of stock increased; regardless of the measure we adopt, compensation responds strongly to innovations in shareholder wealth; measured as dollar changes in compensation, incentives have strengthened over time, measured as percentage changes in wealth, they have not changed in any appreciable way.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: CEO; Pay–Performance Sensitivity; Stock; Options; Financial Economics; G34; J33; M52.
Ano: 2010
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/92834

Monitoring Managers: Does it Matter?
Provedor de dados: Research in Agricultural & Applied Economics (AgEcon Searh)
Autores: Cornelli,   Francesca; Kominek,   Zbigniew; Ljungqvist,   Alexander.
We test under what circumstances boards discipline managers and whether such interventions improve performance. We exploit exogenous variation due to the staggered adoption of corporate governance laws in formerly Communist countries coupled with detailed ‘hard’ information about the board’s performance expectations and ‘soft’ information about board and CEO actions and the board’s beliefs about CEO competence in 473 mostly private-sector companies backed by private equity funds between 1993 and 2008. We find that CEOs are fired when the company underperforms relative to the board’s expectations, suggesting that boards use performance to update their beliefs. CEOs are especially likely to be fired when evidence has mounted that they are incompetent and...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Corporate Governance; Large Shareholders; Boards of Directors; CEO Turnover; Legal Reforms; Transition Economies; Private Equity; Financial Economics; G34; G24; G32; K22; O16; P21.
Ano: 2010
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/60665