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| Registros recuperados: 10 | |
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| Thomas, Alban; Bontems, Philippe. |
| This paper considers an agricultural production model of sequential nitrogen application under risk. Because of random shocks between successive production stages, optimal fertilization decisions depend on the magnitude of farmers' risk aversion (risk premium), and the possibility for farmers to process information (value of information). We propose a joint estimation procedure of technology and risk aversion parameters, using a structural, simulation-based econometric technique. Parameter estimates for the representative farmer's utility function allow to compute both the value of information and the risk premium for farmers. Those account together for about 30 percent of fertilizer cost for Midwest corn producers. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; Risk and Uncertainty. |
| Ano: 1998 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/20844 |
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| Bontems, Philippe; Thomas, Alban. |
| We consider a general model of regulation for a risk-averse agent who observes her private-information parameter after the contract is signed. The latter specifies a quota for input used in production, whose decomposition among different production stages is unknown to the regulator. We characterize the optimal solution to the regulator problem, under general assumptions on net expected social surplus and the agent utility function. We apply the model to the case of pollution control by an environmental agency, where the agent is a risk-averse farmer facing production risk because of nitrogen leaching, and the private-information parameter measures the soil capacity in retaining nitrogen. The farmer sequential decision model is estimated on French crop... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/20727 |
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| Bontems, Philippe; Bouamra-Mechemache, Zohra. |
| The goal of this paper is to analyze vertical contracts between manufacturers and retailers in a channel including the upstream input market. Using a Nash bargaining framework, we study the contract negotiations between manufacturers and the common retailer, both in a simultaneous and sequential game. The oligopsonistic behavior of manufacturers on the upstream market provides a new explanation for predatory accommodation. With two-parts tariff, we show that joint profit of the industry is not maximised at simultaneous bilateral bargaining equilibria and that below marginal cost pricing in the intermediate goods market arises, when final products are substitutes, and may be welfare improving. When negotiations occurs sequentially, we show, in the... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Agribusiness. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/22044 |
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| Bontems, Philippe; Fulton, Murray E.. |
| In this paper, we show formally that cooperatives can possess an informational - and hence cost - advantage compared to For Profit Firms. This advantage is directly linked to the goal alignment between the cooperative and its members, and is influenced by the extent of income redistribution between members. Hence the standard practice of modeling the cooperative and the FPF as having identical cost structures appears to be theoretically unsound. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Agribusiness. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/20073 |
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| Bontems, Philippe; Rotillon, Gilles; Turpin, Nadine. |
| We consider a model of regulation for nonpoint source water pollution through non linear taxation/subsidization of agricultural production. Farmers are heterogenous along two dimensions, their ability to transform inputs into final production and the available area they possess. Asymmetric information and participation of farmers to the regulation scheme put constraints on the optimal policy that we characterize. We show that a positive relationship between size of land and ability may exacerbate adverse selection effects. We then introduce acceptability constraints and show that the intervention under acceptability amounts to reallocate production towards inefficient farmers who benefit from the reform at the expense of efficient producers. Last, we... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19150 |
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| Bontems, Philippe; Vercammen, James. |
| The purpose of the paper is to theoretically examine the welfare implications of public sector involvement in agricultural biotechnology R&D. The model assumes that firms (either a private duopoly consisting of a pair of for-profit firms or a mixed duopoly consisting of one for-profit firm and one public firm) compete in a winner-take-all patent race that is subject to R&D spillovers. Unlike previous research, spillovers are explicitly incorporated into the race, and the size of the prize that accrues to the winner, as well as the size of the ex post social surplus, is contingent on whether or not the public firm participates in the stage two product market. The welfare results concerning the implication of public sector involvement in the R&D... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21367 |
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| Bontems, Philippe; Rotillon, Gilles. |
| In this paper, we theoretically explore the implications of social norms in deterring pollution standard fraud along with economic incentives provided both by markets and regulatory activities. The model assumes that a large number of risk-averse individuals differ not only in their private cost of compliance with the environmental standard but also in their individual aversion to fraud. The aversion of fraud is influenced by the extent of social norms. We show that there may be multiple equilibrium rates of compliance for a given enforcement policy. We also show that under risk aversion the potential loss in market revenues has an ambiguous effect on the equilibrium rates of compliance. Similarly, increasing the probability of audit may decrease the... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/9974 |
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| Bontems, Philippe. |
| We explore in this paper the consequences of status seeking preferences among agents contracting with a private principal in the context of production. We examine in particular the case of envy and we show that in general envy entails augmented distortions due to asymmetric information in optimal contracts. Furthermore if the principal neglects the preferences of the agents with respect to status, then potentially there is under-participation to the contract. We also show that if the principal is free to choose who can participate to the contract, then under some conditions the principal may prefer to contract with only a subset of potentially "profitable" agents (that is where his utility is strictly positive). We then ask whether contracting with agents... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Status; Adverse selection; Contracts; Envy; Externalities; Production Economics; D6; H0; D86. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/49507 |
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| Registros recuperados: 10 | |
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