Data/hora: 26/07/2024 22:41:20

Provedor de dados: 	Research in Agricultural & Applied Economics (AgEcon Searh)	
País: 	United States	
Título: 	Unemployment and the "Labour-Management Conspiracy"	
Autores: 	Karp,   Larry S.; Paul,   Thierry.	
Data: 	2006-02-02	
Ano: 	1998	
Palavras-chave: 	Unemployment; Government subsidies; Wage bargaining; Labor and Human Capital; J58; J68.	
Resumo: 	We study a model in which management and a union bargain sequentially, first choosing a rule that will later determine the level of employment, and then choosing a wage. The government then chooses an output or an employment subsidy. An exogenous natural turnover rate in the unionized sector creates unemployment whenever the union wage exceeds the competitive wage. Government intervention can increase both the equilibrium amount of unemployment and worsen the intersectoral allocation of labour, because of the induced change in the endogenous wage. Unemployment weakens but does not eliminate the possibility of a "labour-management conspiracy".	
Tipo: 	Working or Discussion Paper	
Idioma: 	Inglês	
Identificador: 	19733

http://purl.umn.edu/25040	
Editor: 	AgEcon Search	
Relação: 	University of California, Berkeley&gt;Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics&gt;CUDARE Working Papers

CUDARE Working Paper 841	
Formato: 	39

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