Consulta: subjectFacets:"Duration models."
Registros recuperados: 1
Data/hora: 27/07/2024 08:23:57

Bargaining over governments in a stochastic environment
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Merlo,   Antonio.
In this paper we structurally estimate a game-theoretic model of government formation in a multiparty parliamentary democracy.  We focus on the timing and the terms of government agreements in the context of a multilateral stochastic model of sequential bargaining with complete information (Merlo and Wilson (1194, 1995)) where efficient delays may occur in the unique equilibrium.  Besides showing that our model yields a good fit to the data on the duration of negotiations over government formation as well as government durations in postwar Italy, we use our estimates to quantify the advantage to proposing and to conduct policy experiments to evaluate the effects of changes in the bargaining procedure.  We show that the gains from proposing tend to be quite...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Noncooperative bargaining; Delay; Government formation; Structural estimation; Duration models.; Political Economy; C41; C51; C73; C78; D72.
Ano: 1996
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7476