Consulta: subjectFacets:"Endogenous interactions"
Registros recuperados: 4
Data/hora: 27/07/2024 02:08:52

A C++ PLATFORM FOR THE EVOLUTION OF TRADE NETWORKS
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: McFadzean,   David; Tesfatsion,   Leigh.
This paper presents a general C++ platform for the implementation of a trade network game (TNG) that combines evolutionary game play with preferential partner selection.  In the TNG, successive generations of resource constrained traders choose and refuse trade partners on the basis of continually updated expected payoffs, engage in risky trades modelled as two-person games, and evolve their trade strategies over time.  The modular design of the TNG platform facilitates experimentation with alternative specifications for market structure, trade partner matching, trading, expectation formation, and trade strategy evolution.  The TNG platform can be used to study the evolutionary implications of these specifications at three different levels: individual...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: C++ platform; Trade networks; Evolutionary game; Partner matching; Endogenous interactions; Agent-based computational economics; Artificial life; International Relations/Trade.
Ano: 1996
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18192

A TRADE NETWORK GAME WITH ENDOGENOUS PARTNER SELECTION
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Tesfatsion,   Leigh.
This paper develops a Trade Network Game (TNG) that combines evolutionary game play with endogenous partner selection. Resource-constrained buyers and sellers choose and refuse trade partners on the basis of continually updated expected payoffs. Partner selection takes place in accordance with a "deferred choice and refusal" mechanism that is shown to have interesting stability, optimality, and uniqueness properties.  The iterated prisoner's dilemma strategies used by buyers and sellers to conduct their trades are evolved over time via a genetic algorithm that biases reproduction in favor of strategies that have been successful in past trades.  The TNG is shown to encompass a variety of economic applications, such as job search games, labor markets...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Trade networks; Evolutionary game; Optimal search; Endogenous interactions; Iterated prisoner's dilemma; Multi-armed bandit game; Assignment game; Preferential partner matching; Genetic algorithm; Artificial life; Criterion filtering; International Relations/Trade.
Ano: 1995
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18191

GALE-SHAPLEY MATCHING IN AN EVOLUTIONARY TRADE NETWORK GAME
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Tesfatsion,   Leigh.
For a postscript copy of this paper, click &lt;a href="/Data/isu/er43.ps"&gt; here. &lt;/A&gt;  This study investigates the performance of Gale-Shapley matching in an evolutionary market context.  Computational experimental findings are reported for an evolutionary match-and-play trade network game in which resource-constrained traders repeatedly choose and refuse trade partners in accordance with Gale-Shapley matching, participate in risky trades modelled as two-person prisoner's dilemma games, and evolve their trade behavior over time.  Particular attention is focused on correlations between ex ante market structure and the formation of trade networks, and between trade network formation and the types of trade behavior and social welfare outcomes that...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Evolutionary game; Gale-Shapley matching; Iterated prisoners' dilemma; Trade networks; Endogenous interactions; Agent-based computational economics; International Relations/Trade; C7; C8; C9; D8; D4.
Ano: 1998
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18200

STRUCTURE, BEHAVIOR, AND MARKET POWER IN AN EVOLUTIONARY LABOR MARKET WITH ADAPTIVE SEARCH
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Tesfatsion,   Leigh.
This study uses an agent-based computational labor market framework to undertake a systematic experimental investigation of the relationship between job capacity, job concentration, and market power.  Job capacity is measured by the ratio of total potential job openings to total potential work offers, and job concentration is measured by the ratio of work suppliers to employers.  For each setting of the capacity and concentration treatment factors, work suppliers and employers repeatedly seek preferred worksite partners based on continually updated expected utility, engage in efficiency-wage worksite interactions modelled as prisoner's dilemma games, and evolve their worksite behaviors over time.  The main finding is that job capacity consistently trumps...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Labor market dynamics; Market power; Job capacity; Job concentration; Adaptive search; Networks; Endogenous interactions; Agent-based computational economics; Evolutionary game; Labor and Human Capital.
Ano: 1999
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18197