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The Causes of Corruption: Evidence from China AgEcon
Dong, Bin; Torgler, Benno.
In this study we explore in detail the causes of corruption in China using two different sets of data at the regional level (provinces and cities). We observe that regions with more anti-corruption efforts, histories of British rule, higher openness, more access to media and relatively higher wages of government employees are markedly less corrupt; while social heterogeneity, regulation, abundance of resource and state-owned enterprises substantially breed regional corruption. Moreover, fiscal decentralization is discovered to depress corruption significantly, while administrative decentralization fosters local corruption. We also find that there is currently a positive relationship between corruption and economic development in China that is mainly driven...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Corruption; China; Government; Decentralization; Deterrence; Social Heterogeneity; Political Economy; D730; H110; K420.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/91024
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The Consequences of Corruption: Evidences from China AgEcon
Dong, Bin; Torgler, Benno.
With complementary Chinese data sets and alternative corruption measures, we explore the consequences of corruption. Adopting a novel approach we provide evidence that corruption can have both, positive and negative effects, on economic development. The overall impact of corruption might be the balance of the two simultaneous effects within a specific institutional environment (“grease the wheels” and “sand the wheels”). Corruption is observed to considerably increase income inequality in China. We also find that corruption strongly reduces tax revenue. Looking at things from an expenditure point of view we observe that corruption significantly decreases government spending on education, R&D and public health in China. We also observe that regional...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Corruption; China; Government; Economic Development; Inequality; Environment; Political Economy; D720; H110; K420.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/91006
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Interactions between State and Federal Climate Change Policies AgEcon
Goulder, Lawrence H.; Stavins, Robert N..
Federal action addressing climate change is likely to emerge either through new legislation or via the U.S. EPA’s authority under the Clean Air Act. The prospect of federal action raises important questions regarding the interconnections between federal efforts and state-level climate policy developments. In the presence of federal policies, to what extent will state efforts be cost-effective? How does the co-existence of state- and federal-level policies affect the ability of state efforts to achieve emissions reductions? This paper addresses these questions. We find that state-level policy in the presence of a federal policy can be beneficial or problematic, depending on the nature of the overlap between the two systems, the relative stringency of...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Global Climate Change; Federalism; Cap-And-Trade; Carbon Tax; Regulation; Environmental Economics and Policy; H110; H770; K320; L510; Q480; Q540.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/93413
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The Effect of Allowance Allocations on Cap-and-Trade System Performance AgEcon
Hahn, Robert W.; Stavins, Robert N..
We examine an implication of the “Coase Theorem” which has had an important impact both on environmental economics and on public policy in the environmental domain. Under certain conditions, the market equilibrium in a cap-and-trade system will be cost-effective and independent of the initial allocation of tradable rights. That is, the overall cost of achieving a given aggregate emission reduction will be minimized, and the final allocation of permits will be independent of the initial allocation. We call this the independence property. This property is very important because it allows equity and efficiency concerns to be separated in a relatively straightforward manner. In particular, the property means that the government can establish the overall...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Cap-and-Trade System; Tradable Permits; Coase Theorem; Allowance Allocation; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q580; H110; L510.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/92707
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