|
|
|
| Registros recuperados: 31 | |
|
|
| Bosetti, Valentina; De Cian, Enrica. |
| In this paper we argue that when a subgroup of countries cooperate on emission reduction, the optimal response of non-signatory countries reflects the interaction between three potentially opposing factors, the incentive to free-ride on the benefits of cooperation, the incentive to expand the demand of fossil fuels, and the incentive to adopt cleaner technologies introduced by the coalition. Using an Integrated Assessment Model with a game theoretic structure we find that cost-benefit considerations would lead OECD countries to undertake a moderate, but increasing abatement effort (in line with the pledges subscribed in Copenhagen). Even if emission reductions are moderate, OECD countries find it optimal to allocate part of their resources to energy... |
| Tipo: Working Paper |
Palavras-chave: Technology Spillovers; Climate Change; Partial Cooperation; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q54; Q55; C72. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/119104 |
| |
|
| |
|
|
| Bosetti, Valentina; Drouet, Laurent. |
| The key role of technological change in the decline of energy and carbon intensities of aggregate economic activities is widely recognized. This has focused attention on the issue of developing endogenous models for the evolution of technological change. With a few exceptions this is done using a deterministic framework, even though technological change is a dynamic process which is uncertain by nature. Indeed, the two main vectors through which technological change may be conceptualized, learning through R&D investments and learning-by-doing, both evolve and cumulate in a stochastic manner. How misleading are climate strategies designed without accounting for such uncertainty? The main idea underlying the present piece of research is to assess and... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/12143 |
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
| Bosetti, Valentina; Carraro, Carlo; Massetti, Emanuele. |
| Most analyses of the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms focus on the cost effectiveness of “where” flexibility (e.g. by showing that mitigation costs are lower in a global permit market than in regional markets or in permit markets confined to Annex 1 countries). Less attention has been devoted to “when” flexibility, i.e. to the benefits of allowing emission permit traders to bank their permits for future use. In the model presented in this paper, banking of carbon allowances in a global permit market is fully endogenised, i.e. agents may decide to bank permits by taking into account their present and future needs and the present and future decisions of all the other agents. It is therefore possible to identify under what conditions traders find it optimal to... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Emission Trading; Banking; Environmental Economics and Policy; International Relations/Trade; C72; H23; Q25; Q28. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6362 |
| |
|
|
| Bosetti, Valentina; Cassinelli, Mariaester; Lanza, Alessandro. |
| Tourism destination benchmarking and the assessment of tourism management performances are a crucial and challenging task in the direction of evaluating tourism sustainability and reshaping tourism activities. However, assessing tourism management efficiency per se may not provide enough information concerning long-term performances, which is what sustainability is about. Natural resources management should therefore be included in the analysis to provide a more exhaustive picture of long-run sustainable efficiency and tourism performances. Indeed, while the environmental endowment of a site is a key feature in tourism destination comparison, what really matters is its effective management. Therefore, in this paper we assess and compare tourism... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/12156 |
| |
|
|
| Bosetti, Valentina; Tavoni, Massimo; Carraro, Carlo. |
| This paper builds on the assumption that OECD countries are (or will soon be) taking actions to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. These actions, however, will not be sufficient to control global warming, unless developing countries also get involved in the cooperative effort to reduce GHG emissions. This paper investigates the best short-term strategies that emerging economies can adopt in reacting to OECD countries’ mitigation effort, given the common long-term goal to prevent excessive warming without hampering economic growth. Results indicate that developing countries would incur substantial economic losses by following a myopic strategy that disregards climate in the short-run, and that their optimal investment behaviour is to anticipate the... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Energy-economy Modeling; Climate Policy; Developing Countries; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q54; Q55; Q43. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/52541 |
| |
|
|
| Bosetti, Valentina; Carraro, Carlo; Sgobbi, Alessandra; Tavoni, Massimo. |
| Despite the growing concern about actual on-going climate change, there is little consensus about the scale and timing of actions needed to stabilise the concentrations of greenhouse gases. Many countries are unwilling to implement effective mitigation strategies, at least in the short-term, and no agreement on an ambitious global stabilisation target has yet been reached. It is thus likely that some, if not all countries, will delay the adoption of effective climate policies. This delay will affect the cost of future policy measures that will be required to abate an even larger amount of emissions. What additional economic cost of mitigation measures will this delay imply? At the same time, the uncertainty surrounding the global stabilisation target to be... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Uncertainty; Climate Policy; Stabilisation Costs; Delayed Action; Environmental Economics and Policy; C72; H23; Q25; Q28. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/44219 |
| |
|
| |
|
|
| Bosetti, Valentina; Paltsev, Sergey; Reilly, John M.; Carraro, Carlo. |
| In the absence of significant greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation, many analysts project that atmospheric concentrations of species identified for control in the Kyoto protocol could exceed 1000 ppm (carbon-dioxide-equivalent) by 2100 from the current levels of about 435 ppm. This could lead to global average temperature increases of between 2.5 and 6°C by the end of the century. There are risks of even greater warming given that underlying uncertainties in emissions projections and climate response are substantial. Stabilization of GHG concentrations that would have a reasonable chance of meeting temperature targets identified in international negotiations would require significant reductions in GHG emissions below “business-as-usual” levels, and indeed from... |
| Tipo: Working Paper |
Palavras-chave: Emissions Pricing; Climate Stabilization; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q54; Q58. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/119102 |
| |
|
|
| Tavoni, Massimo; Bosetti, Valentina; Sohngen, Brent. |
| This paper investigates the potential contribution of forestry management in meeting a CO2 stabilization policy of 550 ppmv by 2100. In order to assess the optimal response of the carbon market to forest sequestration we couple two global models. An energy-economy-climate model for the study of climate policies is linked with a detailed forestry model through an iterative procedure to provide the optimal abatement strategy. Results show that forestry is a determinant abatement option and could lead to significantly lower policy costs if included. Linking forestry management to the carbon market has the potential to delay the policy burden, and is expected to reduce the price of carbon of 40% by 2050. Biological sequestration will mostly come from avoided... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10263 |
| |
|
|
| Bosetti, Valentina; Frankel, Jeffrey. |
| Three gaps in the Kyoto Protocol most badly need to be filled: the absence of emission targets extending far into the future, the absence of participation by the United States, China, and other developing countries, and the absence of reason to think that members will abide by commitments. To be politically acceptable, any new treaty that fills these gaps must, we believe, obey certain constraints regarding country-by-country economic costs. We offer a framework of formulas that assign quantitative allocations of emissions, across countries, one budget period at a time. The two-part plan: (i) China and other developing countries accept targets at BAU in the coming budget period, the same period in which the US first agrees to cuts below BAU; and (ii)... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: International Climate Agreements; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q; Q40; Q54. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/55291 |
| |
|
|
| Bosetti, Valentina; Carraro, Carlo; De Cian, Enrica; Massetti, Emanuele; Tavoni, Massimo. |
| This paper analyses the incentives to participate in and the stability of international climate coalitions. Using the integrated assessment model WITCH, the analysis of coalitions’ profitability and stability is performed under alternative assumptions concerning the pure rate of time preference, the social welfare aggregator and the extent of climate damages. We focus on the profitability, stability, and “potential stability” of a number of coalitions which are “potentially effective” in reducing emissions. We find that only the grand coalition under a specific sets of assumptions finds it optimal to stabilise GHG concentration below 550 ppm CO2-eq. However, the grand coalition is found not to be stable, not even “potentially stable” even through an... |
| Tipo: Working Paper |
Palavras-chave: Climate Policy; Climate Coalition; Game Theory; Free Riding; Environmental Economics and Policy; C68; C72; D58; Q54. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/120048 |
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
| Bosetti, Valentina; Victor, David G.. |
| Modellers have examined a wide array of ideal-world scenarios for regulation of greenhouse gases. In this ideal world, all countries limit emissions from all economic sectors; regulations are implemented by intelligent, well-informed forward-looking agents; all abatement options, such as new energy technologies and forestry offsets, are available; trade in goods, services and emission credits is free and unfettered. Here we systematically explore more plausible second-best worlds. While analysts have given inordinate attention to which countries participate in regulation—what we call “variable geometry”—which has a strikingly small impact on total world cost of carbon regulations if international trade in emission credits allows economies to... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Greenhouse Gases; Second-best Regulation; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q5; Q58. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/60663 |
| |
| Registros recuperados: 31 | |
|
|
|
