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| Canton, Joan; David, Maia; Sinclair-Desgagne, Bernard. |
| This paper considers the environmental policy and welfare implications of a merger between environment firms (i.e., firms managing environmental resources or supplying pollution abatement goods and services). The traditional analysis of mergers in Cournot oligopolies is extended in two ways. First, we show how environmental policy affects the incentives of environment firms to merge. Second, we stress that mergers in the eco-industry impact welfare beyond what is observed in other sectors, due to an extra effect on pollution abatement efforts; this might lead to disagreements between an anti-trust agency seeking to limit market concentration which can be detrimental to consumer surplus and a benevolent regulator who maximizes total welfare. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Eco-Industry; Environmental Policy; Horizontal Mergers; D62; H23; L11. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/37524 |
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| Canton, Joan. |
| Environmental policies are discussed when two countries differ in their ability to abate pollution. Northern eco-industries (the industry supplying abatement activities) are more efficient than Southern ones. Segmented environmental markets and a Northern monopoly yield identical second-best taxes in both countries. When markets are global, Southern countries underestimate the market power of eco-industries. Introducing competition creates positive (resp. negative) rent-shifting distortions in South (resp. North). Cooperation could reduce Northern pollution but has ambiguous consequences in South. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10274 |
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| Canton, Joan. |
| In this partial equilibrium and static model, the impact of environmentalism on two countries' environmental policies is presented. First, the only (indirect) way environmentalists influence the choice of pollution taxes is through a negative term in the welfare function in Home. It is defined as passive environmentalism (PE). Second, this article is a first attempt to consider domestic environmentalists lobbying a foreign government. It is defined as active environmentalism (AE). Our contribution is threefold. We emphasize first that the way environmentalists act is paramount to study the consequences of their actions. Passive or active environmentalisms have very different impacts on environmental policies. Second, we show that lobbying activities can be... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmentalism; Lobby Groups; Positive Environmental Economics; Strategic Environmental Policy; Environmental Economics and Policy; H23; D72. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/54303 |
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| Canton, Joan. |
| An incumbent government maximizes its chances of being reelected. Its objective function encompasses both social welfare and political contributions. Its only instrument is a pollution tax. In an open-economy context, we introduce an eco-industry in addition to lobbies of polluting firms and environmentalists. Not only does the eco-industry lobby add a new political contribution toward a higher environmental tax, it also modifies the incentives of the usual lobbies. When the foreign environmental policy is constant, environmentalists can be in favor of a decrease in the local tax in order to reduce foreign pollution. It could also be in the interest of a vertical industrial pressure group to lobby toward more stringent environmental policy. In general, the... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10271 |
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