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| Registros recuperados: 36 | |
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| Parry, Ian W.H.. |
| This paper discusses how carbon abatement policies interact with the tax system, and how these interactions affect the overall costs of carbon controls. We provide formulas for adjusting cost estimates of auctioned and grandfathered carbon emissions from partial equilibrium energy models into rough estimates of general equilibrium costs that account for fiscal interactions. In the basic model with a tax on labor income, the general equilibrium costs of (revenue-neutral) auctioned permits are around 25% higher than the partial equilibrium costs; those of grandfathered permits, which do not directly raise revenues for recycling, are typically more than 100% higher. However, when allowance is made for complicating factors, such as the effect of tax subsidies... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Carbon permits; Tax distortions; Revenue recycling; General equilibrium costs; Environmental Economics and Policy; Public Economics; Q28; H21. |
| Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10481 |
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| Parry, Ian W.H.. |
| This paper uses analytical and numerical general equilibrium models to assess the efficiency impacts of agricultural policies in a second-best setting with pre-existing distortionary taxes. We analyze production subsidies, production quotas, acreage controls, subsidies for acreage reductions and lump sum transfers to agricultural producers. We find that pre-existing taxes raise the cost of all these policies and by a substantial amount. Under our central estimates this increase in cost is typically at least 100-200 percent. Two effects underlie these results. First, raising the rates of distortionary taxes to finance subsidy policies leads to additional efficiency losses. Second, policies that raise (lower) the costs of producing agricultural output lead... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Agricultural policies; Distortionary taxes; Efficiency impacts; General equilibrium analysis; Agricultural and Food Policy; Q18; H21. |
| Ano: 1997 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10905 |
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| Parry, Ian W.H.. |
| Grandfathered emissions permits redistribute income to wealthy households by creating firm rents that ultimately accrue to shareholders. Consequently, they can be highly regressive, even if the poor do not have large budget shares for polluting goods. Using an analytical model, this paper estimates the burden borne by different income groups when emissions permits are used to control power plant emissions of carbon, SO2, and NOx. We also compare the burden borne by poor households under permits with that under emissions taxes, performance standards, technology mandates, and input taxes. And we show how the social costs of policies differ from efficiency costs when society has aversion to inequality. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Equity effects; Pollution controls; Emissions permits; Social welfare function; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q28; H22; H23. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10523 |
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| Parry, Ian W.H.. |
| This paper derives and implements formulas for the welfare effects of differentiated and uniform mileage taxes, gasoline taxes, and per mile insurance premiums, for reducing the external costs of passenger vehicle accidents. The model distinguishes three driver groups and five vehicle groups, and we obtain estimates of external accident costs per mile for each group from crash data. The (average) external accident cost is estimated at 2.2-6.6 cents per mile. Accidents costs differ substantially across drivers of different ages, but only moderately across different vehicles groups. Annual welfare gains from a mileage tax differentiated across drivers and vehicles according to marginal external costs are $9.4 billion in the benchmark case. The uniform... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Traffic accidents; External costs; Pricing policies; Insurance reform; Public Economics; R48; H22; H23. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10674 |
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| Parry, Ian W.H.. |
| This paper compares the efficiency of a single lane toll, a congestion tax applied uniformly across freeway lanes, a gasoline tax, and a transit fare subsidy at reducing traffic congestion. The model incorporates a variety of conditions required to reach an efficient outcome. These include conditions for the efficient allocation of travel among competing modes, travel at peak versus off-peak periods, and drivers with high and low time costs sorted onto faster and slower freeway lanes. Each policy violates some or all of the efficiency conditions. Under wide parameter scenarios, the single lane toll, gasoline tax, and transit subsidy forgo at least two thirds of the efficiency gains under an "ideal" congestion tax that varies across lanes. In contrast, the... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Externalities; Efficiency effects; Congestion taxes; Single lane tolls; Rail subsidies; Gasoline taxes; Public Economics; R41; R48; D62. |
| Ano: 2000 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10517 |
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| Parry, Ian W.H.. |
| This paper develops an analytical framework for comparing the marginal excess burden (MEB) of labor taxes and various commodity taxes, allowing for externalities and interactions between the taxes, and applies the analysis to the United Kingdom. Due to parameter uncertainty and model simplifications the results should be viewed with caution, nonetheless there are some useful insights. For example, even though taxes on petrol and cigarettes confer externality benefits, and these goods are relatively weak leisure substitutes, the MEB of these taxes may substantially exceed that of the labor income tax, except under "high" scenarios for externality benefits. In contrast the MEB for alcohol taxes may be smaller than that of the labor tax, though it is still... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Welfare cost; Labor tax; Cigarette tax; Alcohol tax; Petrol tax; Externalities; Political Economy; H21; H23; Q28. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10860 |
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| Fischer, Carolyn; Parry, Ian W.H.; Aguilar, Francisco X.; Jawahar, Puja. |
| In a developing country context, a policy to promote adoption of common environmental content for corporate codes of conduct (COCs) aspires to meaningful results on two fronts. First, adherence to COC provisions should offer economic benefits that exceed the costs of compliance; i.e., companies must receive a price premium, market expansion, efficiency gains, subsidized technical assistance, or some combination of these benefits in return for meeting the requirements. Second, compliance should produce significant improvements in environmental outcomes; i.e., the code must impose real requirements, and monitoring and enforcement must offer sufficient incentives to prevent evasion. With those goals in mind, we explore options for establishing common... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Corporate social responsibility; Codes of conduct; Environmental management; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q2; O19. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10889 |
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| Parry, Ian W.H.; Small, Kenneth A.. |
| This paper develops an analytical framework for assessing the second-best optimal level of gasoline taxation taking into account unpriced pollution, congestion, and accident externalities, and interactions with the broader fiscal system. We provide calculations of the optimal taxes for the US and the UK under a wide variety of parameter scenarios, with the gasoline tax substituting for a distorting tax on labor income. Under our central parameter values, the second-best optimal gasoline tax is $1.01/gal for the US and $1.34/gal for the UK. These values are moderately sensitive to alternative parameter assumptions. The congestion externality is the largest component in both nations, and the higher optimal tax for the UK is due mainly to a higher assumed... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Gasoline tax; Pollution; Congestion; Accidents; Fiscal interactions; Public Economics; H21; H23; R48. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10461 |
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| Parry, Ian W.H.; Bento, Antonio M.. |
| This paper uses analytical and numerical models to illustrate how the presence of other distortions within the transport system changes the overall welfare effect of a congestion tax. These other distortions include a transit fare subsidy, congestion on competing (unpriced) routes, accident externalities, gasoline taxes, and pollution externalities. Each of these pre-existing distortions can substantially alter the welfare effect of a congestion tax that would be predicted by a first-best analysis. If congestion taxes encourage travel on other congested routes, they can produce sizeable indirect welfare losses. In addition, induced reductions in the demand for gasoline can lead to substantial welfare losses when, as appears to be the case for European... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Congestion tax; Welfare effect; Transit subsidy; Gasoline tax; Accidents; Pollution; Public Economics; R41; H21; H23. |
| Ano: 2000 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10678 |
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| Parry, Ian W.H.. |
| This paper provides simple formulas for adjusting the costs of carbon taxes and tradable carbon permits to account for interactions with preexisting tax distortions in the labor market. Both policies reduce labor supply as they increase product prices and reduce real household wages; the resulting efficiency losses in the labor market can be substantial relative to partial equilibrium abatement costs. However, much of this added cost can be offset-and perhaps more than offset when additional distortions from the tax system are considered-if revenues from carbon taxes or auctioned permits are used to reduce distortionary taxes. Consequently, there can be a strong case on efficiency grounds for using carbon taxes or auctioned permits over grandfathered... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Carbon taxes; Carbon permits; Fiscal interactions; Revenue recycling; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q28; H21; H23. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10509 |
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| Parry, Ian W.H.; Pizer, William A.; Fischer, Carolyn. |
| Economists have speculated that the welfare gains from technological innovation that reduces the future costs of environmental protection could be a lot more important than the "Pigouvian" welfare gains over time from correcting a pollution externality. If so, then a primary concern in the design of environmental policies should be the impact on induced innovation, and a potentially strong case could be made for additional instruments such as research subsidies. This paper examines the magnitude of the welfare gains from innovation relative to the discounted Pigouvian welfare gains, using a dynamic social planning model in which research and development (R&D) augments a knowledge stock that reduces future pollution abatement costs. We find that the... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2000 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10883 |
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| Parry, Ian W.H.. |
| Previous literature has shown that competition among regional governments may lead to inefficiently low levels of capital taxation, because governments do not take account of the external benefits of capital flight to other regions. However, the fiscal distortion is smaller the more elastic the supply of capital (for the region bloc), if governments are not perfectly competitive, or they behave in part as a revenue-maximizing Leviathan. There has been very little empirical work on the magnitude of the welfare effects of fiscal competition. This paper presents extensive calculations of the welfare effects using a model that incorporates the possibility of Leviathan behavior, strategic behavior by governments, monopsony power in factor markets, and a wide... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Fiscal competition; Tax harmonization; Welfare costs; Leviathan; Strategic behavior; Public Economics; H73; H21; H23. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10848 |
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| Parry, Ian W.H.. |
| It is widely perceived that projected public spending on transportation infrastructure in the metropolitan Washington, DC, area for the next 20 years will not be enough to halt, let alone reverse, the trend of increasing traffic congestion. Consequently, there has been much debate about how additional sources of local revenues might be raised to finance more transportation spending. This paper develops and implements an analytical framework for estimating the efficiency costs of raising $500 million per annum in local revenue from five possible sources. These sources are increasing labor taxes, property taxes, gasoline taxes, transit fares, and implementing congestion taxes. Our model incorporates congestion and pollution externalities, and it allows for... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Transportation; Taxes; Washington DC; Welfare cost; Public Economics; R48; H21; H23. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10552 |
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| Parry, Ian W.H.. |
| Gasoline taxes are widely perceived as the most efficient instrument for reducing gasoline consumption because they exploit all behavioral responses for reducing fuel use, including reduced driving and improved fuel economy. At present, however, higher fuel taxes are viewed as a political nonstarter. Pay-as-you-drive (PAYD) auto insurance, which involves replacing existing lump-sum premiums with premiums that vary in proportion to miles driven, should be more practical, since they do not raise driving costs for the average motorist. We show that when impacts on a broad range of motor vehicle externalities are considered, PAYD also induces significantly higher welfare gains than comparable gasoline tax increases, for fuel reductions below 9%. The reason is... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Gasoline tax; Pay-as-you-drive insurance; Mileage tax; Welfare effects; Motor vehicle externality; Risk and Uncertainty; H21; H23; R48. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10465 |
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| Parry, Ian W.H.. |
| Health policy will be a major issue in Britain's next general election. The Labour government is committed to a substantial increase in funds for the National Health Service (NHS) and has eliminated tax relief for private health insurance. The Conservative Opposition party favors subsidizing private health insurance, though it has pledged to match the government's funding increases for the NHS. This paper develops and implements a methodology for estimating the welfare effects of increasing public and private health care in the United Kingdom, when these policies are financed either by distortionary taxes or by user fees for the NHS. User fees are currently minimal, and the national health market "clears" by creating waiting costs. In the private sector we... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: National Health Service; Private health care; Rationing; Subsidies; Welfare effects; Health Economics and Policy; I18; I11; H42. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10822 |
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| Registros recuperados: 36 | |
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