|
|
|
|
|
| Wood, Peter John. |
| This survey paper examines the problem of achieving global cooperation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Contributions to this problem are reviewed from non-cooperative game theory, cooperative game theory, and implementation theory. Solutions to games where players have a continuous choice about how much to pollute, games where players make decisions about treaty participation, and games where players make decisions about treaty ratification, are examined. The implications of linking cooperation on climate change with cooperation on other issues, such as trade, is examined. Cooperative and non-cooperative approaches to coalition formation are investigated in order to examine the behaviour of coalitions cooperating on climate change. One way to achieve... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Climate change negotiations; Game theory; Implementation theory; Coalition formation; Subgame perfect equilibrium; Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/95061 |
| |
|
| |
|
|
|
