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| Brennan, Timothy J.. |
| We examine the suggestion that if consumers in sufficient numbers are willing to pay the premium to have power generated using low-emission technologies, tax or permit policies become less necessary or stringent. While there are implementation difficulties with this proposal, our purpose is more fundamental: can economics make sense of using preferences as a regulatory instrument? If"green" preferences are exogenously given, to what extent can or should they be regarded as a substitute for other policies? Even with green preferences, production and consumption of polluting goods continues to impose social costs not borne in the market. Moreover, if green preferences are regarded as a policy instrument, the "no policy" baseline would require a problematic... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental regulation; Preference change; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q2; B4; D6. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10787 |
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| Karlan, Dean S.. |
| Questions remain as to whether results from experimental economics games are generalizable to real decisions in non-laboratory settings. Furthermore, important questions persist about whether social capital can help solve seemingly missing credit markets. I conduct two experiments, a Trust game and a Public Goods game, and a survey to measure social capital. I then examine whether behavior in the games predicts repayment of loans to a Peruvian group lending microfinance program. Since the structure of these loans relies heavily on social capital to enforce repayment, this is a relevant and important test of the games, as well as of other measures of social capital. I find that individuals identified as "trustworthy" by the Trust game are in fact less... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Trust game; Experimental economics; Microfinance; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; B4; C9; D8; O1. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28429 |
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