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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (2) Autor Hamada, Koichi (1) Orden, David (1) Schleich, Joachim (1) Sunder, Shyam (1) Palavra-chave Common agency (2) F13 (2) International Relations/Trade (2) Asymmetric information (1) Domestic subsidies and taxes (1) Efficient policies (1) F11 (1) H21 (1) H71 (1) H77 (1) International trade (1) O82 (1) Political economy (1) Tariff negotiation (1) Trade policies (1) Transfer (1) Two-level game (1) WTO (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (2) Ano 2005 (1) 1996 (1) País United States (2) Idioma Inglês (2)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 2 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Efficient choice among domestic and trade policies in the Grossman-Helpman Interest-Group Model AgEcon Schleich, Joachim; Orden, David. This paper generalizes the recent political economy model of Helpman and Grossman in which contributions by producer lobbies and government decisions about trade policies are modeled as a common agency game. We allow the government to choose among domestic as well as trade interventions. When production and trade policies are available, the equilibrium production policies serve the lobbies while the trade policies reflect the country's international market power. When consumption and trade policies are available, tariffs and export subsidies are applied in a small-country model to serve the special interests, and the domestic policies are selected to restore consumer prices to world levels. In a large-country model, the optimal consumption and trade... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Political economy; Trade policies; Domestic subsidies and taxes; Efficient policies; Common agency; International Relations/Trade; F11; F13. Ano: 1996 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7458 Information Asymmetry and the Problem of Transfers in Trade Negotiations and International Agencies AgEcon Hamada, Koichi; Sunder, Shyam. This paper studies the role of transfers among groups within a country as well as among countries in a two level game of international trade negotiations. We show that in order to realize the intended transfer in the presence of asymmetric information on the states of recipients (and donors), a transfer process uses up additional resources. The difficulty of making transfers renders it less likely that a nation would find it individually rational to participate as a member of an international institution. Costly transfers render the internal and international adjustment difficult, and serve as a barrier to trade liberalization. Costly international transfers harden the resistance against trade liberalization in the (potentially) recipient country and... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: International trade; Tariff negotiation; Asymmetric information; Transfer; WTO; Common agency; Two-level game; International Relations/Trade; O82; F13; H21; H71; H77. Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28490 Registros recuperados: 2 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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