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| Registros recuperados: 28 | |
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| Nelson, Robert G.; Beil, Richard O., Jr.. |
| This experiment demonstrates principles of decision-making in dynamic oligopolies, especially the difficulties in forming and maintaining cartels. As an illustration of firm behavior under imperfect competition, the game distinguishes between procedurally rational choices and substantively rational decisions in the context of collusive, Cournot, and competitive equilibria. The paper discusses results from an actual classroom exercise and suggests some additional variations in institutional details. Instructions for students and a spreadsheet program for producing payoff tables are provided in the appendices. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Teaching; Experimental economics; Oligopoly; Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession. |
| Ano: 1995 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/15353 |
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| Vickner, Steven S.; Davies, Stephen P.. |
| This paper develops a simultaneous-equations panel data econometric model to obtain point estimates of market power and pricing conduct in a representative product-differentiated, oligopolistic food market. The importance of this class of markets is recognized given its prevalence in the food and fiber system, especially for final consumer food products. The $1.3 billion domestic spaghetti sauce industry is featured. Although the results indicate firms exert limited market power, a portion of this power is derived from tacit price collusion. A higher degree of price collusion was found among brands within a market segment than between segments. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Market power; Oligopoly; Pricing conduct; Product differentiation; Marketing. |
| Ano: 1999 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/15137 |
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| Richards, Timothy J.; Patterson, Paul M.. |
| Consumer product manufacturers often compete in dynamic, multi-firm oligopolies using multiple strategic tools. While existing empirical models of strategic interaction typically consider only parts of the more general problem, this paper presents a more comprehensive alternative. Marketing decision are dynamically optimal, consistent with optimal consumer choice, and responsive to rival decisions. Using a single-market case study that consists of five years of four-weekly data on ready-to-eat cereal sales, prices, and new brand introductions, we test several hypotheses regarding the nature of strategic interaction among several rival manufacturers. We find that cereal manufacturers price and introduce new brands cooperatively in the same period, but... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Cereal; Differentiated products; Dynamics; Oligopoly; Product line rivalry; Strategic interaction; Demand and Price Analysis; D43; L13; L66; M31; Q13. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43788 |
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| Hamilton, Stephen F.; Richards, Timothy J.; Stiegert, Kyle W.. |
| The effect of advertising on market performance has been a long-standing debate. Advertising that increases the dispersion of consumers’ valuations for advertised goods raises the market power of firms, while advertising that decreases the dispersion of consumers’ valuations leads to narrower price-cost margins and superior performance in markets for advertised goods. Numerous challenges confound the empirical identification of advertising effects on market performance. This paper proposes a simple method that relies on the revealed preferences of firms participating in generic advertising programs. Generic advertising programs provide a unique window through which to observe advertising effects on market performance, because changes in the dispersion of... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Advertising; Oligopoly; Marketing; L1; M37. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/49187 |
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| Requillart, Vincent; Simioni, Michel; Varela Irimia, Xose Luis. |
| In this paper, we analyse the market power of the retail industry in the French tomato market. Following the methods developed in the New Empirical Industrial Organization, we develop a structural model of this industry. The analysis is based on detailed data on final consumption and prices at both shipper and consumer levels for two types of tomatoes in France. The structural model is composed of a system of demand equations, supply equations and pricing equations which include terms which capture the oligopoly and oligopsony power of the retail sector. We show that i) elasticity of demand varies during the year ii) the retail sector exercise only a ‘moderate’ market power iii) the exercise of market power decreases over time iv) If markets were... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Oligopoly; Oligopsony; Fresh products; Industrial Organization. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/44279 |
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| Rossini, Gianpaolo; Vergari, Cecilia. |
| In many industries it is quite common to observe firms delegating the production of essential inputs to independent ventures jointly established with competing rivals. The diffusion of this arrangement and the favourable stance of competition authorities call for the assessment of the social and private desirability of Input Production Joint Ventures (IPJV), which represent a form of input production cooperation, not investigated so far. IPJV can be seen as an intermediate organizational setting lying between the two extremes of vertical integration and vertical separation. Our investigation is based on an oligopoly model with horizontally differentiated goods. We characterize the conditions under which IPJV is privately optimal finding that firms’... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Input Production Joint Venture; Horizontal Differentiation; Oligopoly; Production Economics; L24; L42. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/55288 |
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| Binkley, James K.; Connor, John M.. |
| This paper examines the relationship of 1987 retail grocery prices to supermarket sales concentration across 95 U.S. metropolitan areas. The regression model incorporates a large number of population, retail-cost, and retail competition factors and separate prices by type of grocery item. We find that the concentration-price relationship is sensitive to item type: positive for packaged, branded, dry groceries and unrelated for produce, meat, and dairy product prices. As for market rivalry, we find that small grocery stores provide no grocery price competition for supermarkets. However, branded grocery prices are driven down by fast-food places and by rapid price churning, whereas for unbranded foods the presence of warehouse stores places downward... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Retail grocery trade; Pricing policy; Variable price merchandising; Market competition; Category management; Market structure; Sales concentration; Price discrimination; Price rivalry; Oligopoly; Food demand; Food prices; Consumer/Household Economics. |
| Ano: 1996 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25988 |
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| Kim, Sounghun. |
| In Korea, processed food markets have various shapes of structure: the markets of ice cream, special dietary food, noodles, sugar are highly concentrated, while the markets of gimchi, pickles, and ice are not very concentrated. The level of market concentration changes over time. These market structures and structural changes cause impacts on related industries as well as own industries. For the more successful policies, the paper suggests three ideas: to realize that each food processing industry has a different industry structure, to understand the relationship between the food processing industry and upstream and downstream industries and to take into account opinions from various sources before adopting new policies. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Processed food market; Food processing industry; Market structure; Market concentration; CR4; CR10; Monopoly; Oligopoly; Korea; Korean; Agribusiness; Agricultural and Food Policy; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/45682 |
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| Kim, C.S.; Hallahan, Charles B.; Taylor, Harold; Schluter, Gerald E.. |
| This article examines the effects of increasing market concentration level in the U.S. nitrogen fertilizer industry. Results indicate that the costs of market power are greater than the benefits of market concentration, in terms of manufacturing cost efficiency. To provide a stable nitrogen fertilizer supply at a relatively low price, it may be necessary to control natural gas price and/or reduce new import barriers from Middle East and former member states of the Soviet Union, where low cost gas is produced as a byproduct. Keywords: Nitrogen fertilizer, oligopoly, economies of size, market power, cost-efficiency. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Nitrogen fertilizer; Oligopoly; Economies of size; Market power; Cost-efficiency.; Marketing. |
| Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19674 |
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| Saitone, Tina L.; Sexton, Richard J.; Sexton, Steven E.. |
| Market power is discussed in debates about subsidies for ethanol production. The structural conditions in the corn industry create a case for concerns about market power. We develop an analytical model for determining the production and price impacts and the distribution of benefits from the U.S ethanol subsidy when upstream sellers in the seed sector and downstream buyers in the processing sector may exercise market power. Results demonstrate that the impacts on prices and output are probably limited. Distribution impacts are much greater. Seed producers and corn processors with market power capture relatively large shares of subsidy benefits. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Corn ethanol; Market power; Oligopoly; Oilopsony; Subsidy; Agricultural and Food Policy. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/42457 |
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| Fischer, Thorsten; Kamerschen, David R.. |
| We employ the Rosse-Panzar test to assess market performance in selected airport-pairs originating from Atlanta. The Rosse-Panzar test stands in the tradition of the New Empirical Industrial Organization. It is based on the comparative statics of a reduced form revenue equation. Therefore, it is less powerful than structural models, but it offers the advantage of less stringent data requirements and reduces the risk of model misspecifications. The test statistic allows us in most airport-pairs to reject both conducts consistent with the Bertrand outcome, which is equivalent to perfect competition, and the collusive outcome, which is equivalent to joint profit-maximization. Rather, the test statistic suggests that behavior is consistent with a range of... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Airlines; Oligopoly; Conduct; Price-cost margins; Lerner index; Rosse-Panzar test; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; L00; L40; L93. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/44041 |
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| Registros recuperados: 28 | |
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