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Contracts, Transaction Costs and Agricultural Production in the Pampas AgEcon
Lema, Daniel.
This paper presents an analysis of agricultural contracts using a transaction costs approach. We contend that in a context of modern agriculture, with well defined property rights, agricultural contracts must balance costs and benefits, aligning tenant and landlord incentives towards a similar objective. The study debates the potential effects of tenancy status and duration of contracts, over soil conservation and input use. We present empirical evidence about the effects over the soil and input use in tenant (fixed rent or sharecropping) and owner-operator farms using farm level data from the 2002 National Agricultural Census of Argentina. The empirical results show some differential effects but do not support a general and clear negative effect for...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Contracts; Agriculture; Transaction Costs; Sharecropping; Property Rights; Land Tenancy; Production Economics; D2; Q15.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25420
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Designing Market Based Instruments: Beyond Round One of the Australian MBI Pilot Program AgEcon
Lansdell, Nicola; Stoneham, Gary.
Most markets have evolved as buyers and sellers constantly search for ways to create value, however this has not occurred naturally in all areas of the economy – markets are missing for some goods, including the environment. In such cases, transaction costs linked to property rights, asymmetric and hidden information and packaging problems have often prevented otherwise valuable deals from being negotiated in relation to the environment. However new capabilities and a better knowledge and understanding of the problems at hand now mean that where the objective is clear, and the knowledge, skills and capability exist to understand, model and measure the relevant characteristics of the problem transaction costs are low enough that economists can, in certain...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Transaction Costs; Property Rights; Asymmetric and Private Information; Public Goods; Government Policy; Marketing.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25743
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GOVERNMENT VS. ANARCHY: MODELING THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS AgEcon
Mittenzwei, Klaus; Bullock, David S..
This paper gives a general mathematical definition of an institution, and presents an explicit formal method by which to incorporate institutions in a standard general equilibrium model. We illustrate our concept using a modified Prisoner's dilemma game in which property rights over natural resources emerge from an anarchy-like state of nature. Two players decide voluntarily and non-cooperatively whether to give up some fraction of their personal resource to set up an enforcement mechanism that punishes defecting players (i.e., players that do not opt to cooperate). This enforcement mechanism constitutes a credible threat, and is central to the establishment of bilateral cooperation (i.e, government). We highlight the importance of imperfect...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Institutions; Imperfect Information; Property Rights; Decision Making; Social Games; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession; C72; D7; D81.
Ano: 1999 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21496
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New Producer Strategies: The Emergence of Patron-Driven Entrepreneurship AgEcon
Cook, Michael L.; Burress, Molly J.; Iliopoulos, Constantine.
Abstract—Existing research treats the cooperative structure as relatively homogeneous. The proposed paper argues that all cooperatives are not created equal – and consideration of organizational structure is critical when analyzing the economic impact of cooperation. In recent empirical work, we observe cooperatives forming as single- or multi-purpose; generating equity capital passively, quasi-passively, or proactively; vertically integrating in a centralized, federated, or a hybrid fashion; governing through fixed or proportional control rights; and instituting open, closed or class-varying membership criteria. The emergence of multiple-level rent-seeking cooperatives challenges our traditional rent dispersion models of collective action. We call these...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Collective entrepreneurship; Agribusiness; Property Rights; Agribusiness.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/44397
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Property Rights in Women's Empowerment in Rural India: A Review AgEcon
Roy, Kartik C.; Tisdell, Clement A..
This paper examines the importance of property rights in women’s empowerment in rural India. Arguments justifying the need for granting property rights to women are presented and the distinction is made between legal (formal) and customary (informal) rights. The ineffectiveness of legal right in absence of customary rights has been discussed. Customary rights also become ineffective due to other institutional impediments. These impediments have been discussed. The results of extensive field work in rural West Bengal and Orissa have been presented to illustrate the pattern of development process that poor rural women want and in which the property right is only one component, not the only component.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Gender Inequality; Women's Empowerment; India; Property Rights; Community/Rural/Urban Development.
Ano: 2000 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/100038
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River Sharing and Water Trade AgEcon
Ansink, Erik; Gengenbach, Michael; Weikard, Hans-Peter.
We analyse river sharing games in which a set of agents located along a river shares the available water. Using coalition theory, we find that the potential benefits of water trade may not be sufficient to make all agents in the river cooperate and acknowledge property rights as a prerequisite for trade. Specifically, a complete market for river water may not emerge if there are four or more agents along the river. Instead, a partial market may emerge where a subset of agents trades river water, with the possibility that other agents take some of the river water that passes their territory.
Tipo: Working Paper Palavras-chave: River Sharing; Water Trade; Market Emergence; Property Rights; Coalition Stability; Environmental Economics and Policy; C72; D74; H23; Q25.
Ano: 2012 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/122860
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The Organizational Evolution of Markets for Wood Products in the Southern United States AgEcon
Dunn, Michael A.; Barnes, James N..
This paper represents the first case study attempt to develop a transaction cost conceptual model to describe industry evolution of the paper and lumber industries in the Southern United States around the late 1800s and early 1900s. We use transaction cost theory to explain the co-evolution of markets for wood products noting that variation in the level and type of investments made in physical and human capital assets needed to manage paper and lumber miller operations had a significant influence on the use of wood dealer systems compared to more vertically organized business arrangements. We identify some testable hypotheses and areas of future research.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Industry Evolution; Contracting; Property Rights; Vertical Integration; Forest Products; Industrial Organization; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; L14; L24; L73; J24.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6746
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Women’s Rights and Development AgEcon
Fernandez, Raquel.
Why has the expansion of women’s economic and political rights coincided with economic development? This paper investigates this question, focusing on a key economic right for women: property rights. The basic hypothesis is that the process of development (i.e., capital accumulation and declining fertility) exacerbated the tension in men’s conflicting interests as husbands versus fathers, ultimately resolving them in favor of the latter. As husbands, men stood to gain from their privileged position in a patriarchal world whereas, as fathers, they were hurt by a system that afforded few rights to their daughters. The model predicts that declining fertility would hasten reform of women’s property rights whereas legal systems that were initially more...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Women’s Rights; Property Rights; Economic Development; Labor and Human Capital; D1; O1; Z13.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/90943
Registros recuperados: 8
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