Data/hora: 03/06/2024 11:20:05

Provedor de dados: 	31	
País: 	United States	
Título: 	Cournot Competition on a Network of Markets and Firms	
Autores: 	Ilkilic,   Rahmi.	
Data: 	2009-06-03	
Ano: 	2009	
Palavras-chave: 	Cournot Markets; Networks; Nash Equilibrium; Centrality Measures; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C62; C72; D85; L11.	
Resumo: 	Suppose markets and firms are connected in a bi-partite network, where firms can only supply to the markets they are connected to. Firms compete a la Cournot and decide how much to supply to each market they have a link with. We assume that markets have linear demand functions and firms have convex quadratic cost functions. We show there exists a unique equilibrium in any given network of firms and markets. We provide a formula which expresses the quantities at an equilibrium as a function of a network centrality measure.	
Tipo: 	Working or Discussion Paper	
Idioma: 	Inglês	
Identificador: 	http://purl.umn.edu/50679	
Relação: 	Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)&gt;Sustainable Development Papers

SD

32.2009	
Formato: 	23