Data/hora: 11/06/2024 15:31:25

Provedor de dados: | 31
País: | United States
Título: | Cournot Competition on a Network of Markets and Firms
Autores: | Ilkilic,   Rahmi.
Data: | 2009-06-03
Ano: | 2009
Palavras-chave: | Cournot Markets; Networks; Nash Equilibrium; Centrality Measures; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C62; C72; D85; L11.
Resumo: | Suppose markets and firms are connected in a bi-partite network, where firms can only supply to the markets they are connected to. Firms compete a la Cournot and decide how much to supply to each market they have a link with. We assume that markets have linear demand functions and firms have convex quadratic cost functions. We show there exists a unique equilibrium in any given network of firms and markets. We provide a formula which expresses the quantities at an equilibrium as a function of a network centrality measure.
Tipo: | Working or Discussion Paper
Idioma: | Inglês
Identificador: | http://purl.umn.edu/50679

Relação:

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)&gt;Sustainable Development Papers

SD

32.2009

Formato: | 23