Data/hora: 09/06/2024 18:38:49

Provedor de dados: 	31	
País: 	United States	
Título: 	Contract Duration and the Division of Labor in Agricultural Land Leases	
Autores: 	Yoder,   Jonathan K.; Hossain,   Ishrat; Epplin,   Francis M.; Doye,   Damona G.	
Data: 	2006-03-24	
Ano: 	2005	
Palavras-chave: 	Land lease contracts; Moral hazard; Contract duration; Division of labor; Labor and Human Capital; Land Economics/Use; J43; L23; Q15.	
Resumo: 	Short-term contracts provide weak incentives for durable input investment if post-contract asset transfer is difficult. Our model shows that when both agents provide inputs, optimal contract length balances weak incentives of one agent against the other. This perspective broadens the existing contract duration literature, which emphasizes the tradeoff between risk sharing and contract costs. We develop hypotheses and test them based on private grazing contracts from the Southern Great Plains. We find broad support for the implications of our model. For example, landowners provide durable land-specific inputs more often under annual versus multiyear contracts.	
Tipo: 	Working or Discussion Paper	
Idioma: 	Inglês	
Identificador: 	20462

http://purl.umn.edu/12962	
Editor: 	AgEcon Search	
Relação: 	Washington State University&gt;School of Economic Sciences&gt;Working Papers

Working Paper 2005-6	
Formato: 	39

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