Data/hora: 01/06/2024 11:11:05

Provedor de dados: | 31
País: | United States
Título: | Measuring the Cost-effectiveness of Conservation Auctions Relative to Alternate Policy Mechanisms
Autores: | White,   Benedict; Burton,   Michael P.
Data: | 2010-12-13
Ano: | 2010
Palavras-chave: | Auctions; Conservation; Bio-diversity; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q57.
Resumo: | The principle motivation for using price-discriminating conservation auctions is that they are expected to be significantly more cost-effective than fixed-price mechanisms.  This paper measures cost effectiveness for tenders from two rounds of the Auction for Landscape Recovery in Western Australia relative to counterfactual fixed-price mechanisms.  If we assume that the bid equals the compliance cost, the auction gives a significant cost saving over fixed-price mechanisms.  If instead we assume that bids include an element of rent, fixed-price mechanisms can be more cost effective than the auction.  The significance of these results is that a fixed price scheme may achieve a similar level of cost effectiveness to a conservation auction, when one or more of the following apply:  compliance costs do not vary significantly between producers, auction bids have a significant element of rent and the auction incurs a significant additional administrative cost.
Tipo: | Working or Discussion Paper
Idioma: | Inglês
Identificador: | http://purl.umn.edu/97798

Relação:

University of Western Australia, School of Agricultural and Resource Economics&gt;Working Papers

Working Paper 1006

Formato: | 18