Data/hora: 02/06/2024 18:05:26

Provedor de dados: | 31
País: | United States
Título: | Unilateral and Exclusionary/Strategic Effects of Common Agency: Price Impacts in a Repeated Common Value English Auction
Autores: | Coatney,   Kalyn T.; Shaffer,   Sherrill L.; Menkhaus,   Dale J.; Scheer,   Jennifer L.
Data: | 2010-01-16
Ano: | 2010
Palavras-chave: | Common Value Auctions; Common Agency; Antitrust; Industrial Organization; D44; K21; K23.
Resumo: | The business justification for multiple principals to hire a common agent is efficiency.  Our empirical study demonstrates that the creation of the common agent unilaterally depresses winning bids.  Additionally, the common agent was not only observed to be the dominant bidder but also paid significantly lower prices than fringe competitors (price/quantity differential).  The observed price/quantity differential is consistent with the almost common value English auction theory developed by Rose and Kagel (2008) in which a cost advantaged bidder is able to reduce competition by credibly raising the costs of disadvantaged rivals associated with the winner’s curse.
Tipo: | Working or Discussion Paper
Idioma: | Inglês
Identificador: | http://purl.umn.edu/56529

Relação:

Southern Agricultural Economics Association&gt;2010 Annual Meeting, February 6-9, 2010, Orlando, Florida

Selected Paper

Formato: | 54