Data/hora: 09/06/2024 13:23:29

Provedor de dados: | 31
País: | United States
Título: | Core-stable Rings in Second Price Auctions with Common Values
Autores: | Forges,   Francoise; Orzach,   Ram.
Data: | 2010-11-16
Ano: | 2010
Palavras-chave: | Auctions; Bayesian Game; Collusion; Core; Partition Form Game; Characteristic Function; Environmental Economics and Policy; C71; C72; D44.
Resumo: | In a common value auction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core-stable. More precisely, the ex ante expected utilities of rings, at the (noncooperative) sophisticated equilibrium proposed by Einy, Haimanko, Orzach and Sela (Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2002), describe a cooperative game, in characteristic function form, in spite of the underlying strategic externalities. A ring is core-stable if the core of this characteristic function is not empty. Furthermore, every ring can implement its sophisticated equilibrium strategy by means of an incentive compatible mechanism.
Tipo: | Working or Discussion Paper
Idioma: | Inglês
Identificador: | http://purl.umn.edu/96668

Relação:

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)&gt;Sustainable Development Papers

SD

119.2010

Formato: | 26