Data/hora: 09/06/2024 10:21:25

Provedor de dados: 	31	
País: 	United States	
Título: 	Linking of Repeated Games. When Does It Lead to More Cooperation and Pareto Improvements?	
Autores: 	von Mouche,   Pierre; Folmer,   Henk.	
Data: 	2007-06-27	
Ano: 	2007	
Palavras-chave: 	Environmental Policy; Linking; Folk Theorem; Tensor Game; Prsioners; Full Cooperation; Pareto Efficiency; Minkowski Sum; Vector Maximum; Convex Analysis; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C72.	
Resumo: 	Linking  of repeated games and exchange of concessions in fields of relative strength may lead to more cooperation and to Pareto improvements relative to the situation where each game is played separately. In this paper we formalize these statements,  provide some general results concerning the conditions for more cooperation and Pareto improvements to materialize or not and analyze the relation between both. Special attention is paid to the role of asymmetries.	
Tipo: 	Working or Discussion Paper	
Idioma: 	Inglês	
Identificador: 	26588

http://purl.umn.edu/9557	
Editor: 	AgEcon Search	
Relação: 	Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)&gt;Economic Theory and Applications Working Papers

ETA Nota di Lavoro 60.2007	
Formato: 	19

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