Data/hora: 05/06/2024 04:20:57

Provedor de dados: | 31
País: | United States
Título: | CONSISTENCY AND OPTIMALITY IN A DYNAMIC GAME OF POLLUTION CONTROL I: COMPETITION
Autores: | Batabyal,   Amitrajeet A.
Data: | 1998-04-29
Ano: | 1995
Palavras-chave: | Environmental; Regulation; Tax; Dynamic; Game; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q25; H32; D62.
Resumo: | I model the interaction between a regulator and polluting firms as a Stackelberg differential game in which the regulator leads. The firms create pollution, which results in a stock externality. I analyze the intertemporal effects of alternate pollution control measures in a competitive industry. The principal issue here concerns the dynamic inconsistency of the optimal solution. Inter alia, I compare the steady state levels of pollution under optimal and under time consistent policies.   Forthcoming in Environmental and Resource Economics
Tipo: | Working or Discussion Paper
Idioma: | Inglês

Identificador:

617

http://purl.umn.edu/28351

Editor: | AgEcon Search

Relação:

Utah State University&gt;Economics Department&gt;Economics Research Institute, ERI Study Papers

ERI Study Paper 95-29

Formato:

29

application/pdf