Data/hora: 12/06/2024 15:30:31

Provedor de dados: | 31
País: | United States
Título: | CHEATING ON NONPOINT MARGIN: HOW MUCH MIGHT IT COST?
Autores: | Johansson,   Robert C.
Data: | 2000-05-15
Ano: | 2000
Palavras-chave: | Nonpoint pollution; Emissions trading system; Asymmetric information.; Environmental Economics and Policy.
Resumo: | Trading of pollution permits with banking and borrowing can achieve an optimal distribution of abatement across agents and time.  However, when the environmental constraint is binding under imperfectly observed abatement practices, there is an incentive for sources to misrepresent their activities.  This cheating can erode the efficiency of a permit system in achieving an environmental standard, but it is shown that this incentive to cheat causes similar efficiency losses in a command-and-control mechanism employing a uniform reduction policy.
Tipo: | Conference Paper or Presentation
Idioma: | Inglês

Identificador:

2001

http://purl.umn.edu/21856

Editor: | AgEcon Search

Relação:

American Agricultural Economics Association&gt;2000 Annual meeting, July 30-August 2, Tampa, FL

Selected Paper

Formato:

24

application/pdf