Data/hora: 11/06/2024 08:14:01

Provedor de dados: | 31
País: | United States
Título: | Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study
Autores: | Calsamiglia,   Caterina; Haeringer,   Guillaume; Klijn,   Flip.
Data: | 2009-05-29
Ano: | 2009
Palavras-chave: | School Choice; Matching; Experiment; Gale-Shapley; Top Trading Cycles; Boston Mechanism; Efficiency; Stability; Truncation; Truthtelling; Safety School; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C72; C78; D78; I20.
Resumo: | The literature on school choice assumes that families can submit a preference list over all the schools they want to be assigned to. However, in many real-life instances families are only allowed to submit a list containing a limited number of schools. Subjects' incentives are drastically affected, as more individuals manipulate their preferentes. Including a safety school in the constrained list explains most manipulations. Competitiveness across schools plays an important role. Constraining choices increases segregation and affects the stability and efficiency of the final allocation. Remarkably, the constraint reduces significantly the proportion of subjects playing a dominated strategy.
Tipo: | Working or Discussion Paper
Idioma: | Inglês
Identificador: | http://purl.umn.edu/50480

Relação:

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)&gt;Sustainable Development Papers

SD

29.2009

Formato: | 34