Data/hora: 11/06/2024 17:28:26

Provedor de dados: 	31	
País: 	United States	
Título: 	Is Protection for Sale in U.S. Food Industries?	
Autores: 	Lopez,   Rigoberto A.; Hathie,   Ibrahima.	
Data: 	2006-02-28	
Ano: 	2002	
Palavras-chave: 	Trade protection; Tariffs; Lobbying; Political economy; Food manufacturing; Agribusiness; Agricultural and Food Policy; International Relations/Trade; Political Economy.	
Resumo: 	This article tests the Grossman-Helpman Protection for Sale model using panel data from U.S. food processing industries with endogenous protection, imports, and political organization of industries. The results support the key predictions of the model: organized industries are granted higher protection that decreases with import penetration and the price elasticity of imports, but in unorganized industries protection increases with import penetration. In spite of substantial differences in data sets and empirical procedures, the estimated weight on aggregate welfare is strikingly similar those found by Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandopadhyay (2000), implying that protection is not for sale in these industries. Furthermore, the presence of import quotas raises the level of protection substantially.	
Tipo: 	Working or Discussion Paper	
Idioma: 	Inglês	
Identificador: 	20126

http://purl.umn.edu/25182	
Editor: 	AgEcon Search	
Relação: 	University of Connecticut&gt;Food Marketing Policy Center&gt;Research Reports

Research Report No. 69	
Formato: 	16

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