Data/hora: 01/06/2024 08:32:59

Provedor de dados: 	31	
País: 	United States	
Título: 	Coordination after gains and losses: Is prospect theory’s value function predictive for games?

Koordination nach Gewinnen und Verlusten: Hält die Wertfunktion der Prospekttheorie für strategische Spiele?	
Autores: 	Schade,   Christian; Schroeder,   Andreas; Krause,   Kai Oliver.	
Data: 	2010-03-17	
Ano: 	2010	
Palavras-chave: 	Prospect Game Theory; Prior Outcomes; Coordination; Equilibrium Selection; Economic Experiment; Agribusiness; Agricultural and Food Policy; Financial Economics; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; Risk and Uncertainty.	
Resumo: 	We analyze the effects of prior gain and loss experiences on individuals’ behavior in two coordination games: battle of the sexes and simultaneous market entry. We propose subjectively transformed games that integrate elements of prospect theory, aggregation of prior and subsequent payoffs, and social projection. Mathematical predictions of behavior are derived based on equilibrium selection concepts. Males’ behavior in our experimental studies is largely consistent with our predictions. However, the behavior of many female respondents appears to be rather consistent with interpreting the initial random lottery outcomes used to manipulate prior experiences as a signal for the players’ abilities to compete. This could be related to females’ known uneasiness of competing against counterparts that might be male and thus, a generally higher salience of rivalry in our incentivized experiments. Females also chose to play far more mixed strategies than males indicating some uncertainty about what type of behavior is appropriate.	
Tipo: 	Working or Discussion Paper	
Idioma: 	Inglês	
Identificador: 	http://purl.umn.edu/59524	
Relação: 	Humboldt University Berlin&gt;Institute for Agricultural Economics and Social Sciences&gt;Structural Change in Agriculture/Strukturwandel im Agrarsektor (SiAg) Working Papers

SiAg-Working Paper

08	
Formato: 	55